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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
What Ever Happened to Civil Rights?- //
Is th e Reagan Administration racist? Black leaders are
asking that question-a question that implies its own
answer-with a degree of intensity and even desperation that reflects the pervasive discontent within the
black community over the state of race relations i n
America today.
As we suggested last month , we do not share the view
that either the current Administration or the society at
large has capitulated to racism. While cmTents of racial
prejudice continue to flow in America, they probably
run less deep-they certainly have less legitimacy than they have in the past. There's still a lot of redneck
racism out there, but among the generally well-educated
people who make the society's most important political
and economic decisions, racism- at least the overt and
socially-damaging racism of the past-no longer holds
sway. The movement toward racial equality has indeed
fallen on hard times, but those hard times have to do
less with resurgent racism or moral indifference than
with a genuine sense of bafflement over how best to
proceed.
As was also noted last month, we need not presuppose
any deep moral sensibilities on the part of white Americans to imagine that they understand that the degr adation of black people operates little more in the inter ests
of whites than of blacks. Slums, poverty, and the social
pathologies that go with them degrade us all , regardless
of color and regardless of the state of our moral imaginations. Whatever psychic benefits some whites might
derive from clinging to a sense of racial superiority,
those c~n hardly compensate in America today for the
grievous and evident social costs that racial inequal ity
exacts with respect to crime rates, welfare expenditures,
visual blight, civil disorder, and the general deterioration of the social fabric.
Assuming, then, that even those of the most modest
good will must see that invidious racial di tinctions
harm us all, how do we account for the persistence of
racial inequality? It is our collective dilemma that
the answer to that question involves us in so many complexities, ambiguities, and ideological conundrums that
we are tempted to tum from it in despair to other social
problems that, however difficult or even intractable,
offer at least some promise of return on our efforts to
deal with them. The tragedy of civil rights in America
today is not that nothing has been tried, but that o
much has been tried to so little avail. This is not to say
that we have done enough-clearly we have not - but
April, 1982

rather that our problem consists les in summoning up
the will to do more than in figuring out just what it is
that we should be doing more of.
It would be wrong, of cour e, to ugge t that nothing
has changed for black people in Am rica. In our under standable despair over how far we hav y t to go, we
ought not forget how far we h av already come. In the
area of race relation , we ar e a tran formed ociety
from what we were a quarter-century ago. An article
a while back in th liberal ew Republic argu d th at
the civil rights mov ment of the pa t f w d cade ha
produced "the mo t ma iv change in racial attitud ,
in behavior by white , and in th law that ev r h a b en
wrought peacefully in a major indu trial country." Ilowing for a mea ur of hyp rbole, and ackn owl dging
as well that the d gre of chan e may u ge t more a to
how awful thing w re befor than a to how much b tter
they ar now, it remain tru that th t rm "civil righ t
revolution" involve mor than a loo figur of p
h.
T he marche , the d mon tration , th moral app al
the suffering: th e w r n t all for nothin . By any
reasonable m a ur thing ar ub tantially b tt r for
black peopl in merica toda than th y w r a f 1 0.
Yet so much mi ery r main . h figur
n th in idence among black of pov rty un mpl ym nt, f mil
disintegration, ill gitimate birth, and
r main
depressing, and in many ca
th y continu to h ad in
the wrong direction. For v ry datum of impr v m nt
we might point to anoth r, ontrary tati tic an b
summoned to make any talk of pro r
app ar mindlessly optimi ti . om thin
t 11 our Iv
mu t
be done. And it i at thi p int that w b gin falling all
over our good int ntion and xpr ion f o d will
and getting preci ly nowh r . If rh tori
uld mak
our race problem right, mi ry and in quality would
long ince hav b en 1 ft b hind u . Poli y, h w v r
pre ent a few mor probl m .
The Reagan dmini trati n i op rating on th
bviou a umption that th lib ral p Ii i
m di d
in the Gr at oci ty and in ub qu nt imilar pr ram
have fail d and n d to b dra ti ally r vi d, if n t
imply di carded. Th
dmini trati n want a harp
break with th pa t and it i th pr
of makin that
break that ha~ arou d th ri
f pr t t indignati n
and outrag that i u fr m i il ri ht 1 ad r with
ho
th
uffering that li
predictable rhetoric-n d to b
fir t examin with om car th
make again t th old poli i
3

History may well record that the worst error the modern civil rights movement made was to
invest so much of its time, energy, and moral fervor in such a dubious cause as school busing.

would offer as substitutes.
The first argument is obvious enough: if things are
as bad among black people as everyone suggests, then
the liberal social welfare policies of the Sixties and
Seventies have not delivered on their promises. President Reagan's budget-makers argue that it makes no
sense to send huge new amounts of government money
down the same dead-end road of social failure that has
already swallowed up immense expenditures in the past.
Those who argue that we have not spent enough may
have a case, but they should first lo6k at the figures.
In 1964, the federal government spent 34 billion on
human resources programs (education, health, income
security, nutrition, public assistance, etc.), a figure
that amounted to just short of 29 per cent of the budget.
By 1981, the dollar figure had risen tenfold to 349
billion, and, even more striking, that figure now represented over 53 per cent of the total budget. (The Reagan
projections in social welfare spending, by the way, would
reduce that portion of the budget by just 1.5 per cent
over the course of several years.)
Not all that money goes to the poor, of course, and by
no means all or most of the poor are black, but given
the record, conservatives might be forgiven their skepticism concerning liberal arguments that identify the
well-being of black Americans with ever larger and
more expensive federal programs. If so much money
has brought such ambiguous results in the past, what
reason have we for supposing that major new expenditures will bring significant improvement? Conservatives
are often too glib in their argument that problems cannot be solved simply by throwing money at them, but
it seems clear that in the case of the difficultues of the
urban black community, they have at least something of
a point. Welfare, for example, has been and remains an
essential life-saver for many black families (a point
conservatives often overlook), but social critics from
all over the political spectrum have noted its tendency
to promote such social ills a dependency and family
disintegration.
The Reagan Administration contend that its emphasis
on cutting the rate of inflation and on rejuvenating
the economy through its taxing and pending policies
will do more for black people- and for all other Americans-than any combination of government programs
could hope to do. (The Administration charge , with
some justification, that liberal have tended to ignore
the social costs of inflation and to di regard the role
of social welfare spending in purring inflation.) President Reagan has in effect adopted John Kennedy's
maxim that a rising tide lift all boats. Poverty, he
argues, is best fought by a generally buoyant economy
(with the buoyancy provided by supply- ide incentives)
rather than by specifically-targeted federal programs.
4

One can find economists and economic theories on
either side of this argument, and it is one of those matters best resolved in practice rather than in theoretical
dispute, especially since both sides to the dispute often
seem as driven by ideological commitment as by empirical analysis. It would seem that the debate over
supply-side economics and its attendant doctrines has
been conducted entirely too much as an exercise in
quasi-theological dogmatics. Economics should be
approached as a pragmatic science, not as a moral battlefield or an object of faith.
The President and his advisors may well be right on
the major issues, and if they can manage to get the economy moving again while simultaneously limiting inflation, they will indeed have accomplished more for
black people than any programmatic war on poverty
could be expected to do. But if they are wrong, urban
blacks and other poor people-all those who have been
most affected by the cutbacks in social spending-will
have carried a cruelly disproportionate share of a
losing enterprise.
And even if they are right, the Reaganites often seem
not to understand that even the most heal thy economy
will include in it people who, on either a short or long
term basis, cannot make it entirely on their own. It is
true that a number of Great Society programs intended
to benefit the less fortunate worked badly or not at all,
but a number of others did work, and even many of
those that did not need to be reconceived and revitalized rather than simply scrapped. We need a good deal
more pluralism and private sector involvement in our
human resources programs, but many of those programs
remain necessary in some form, and they cannot all
simply be dumped into the hands of sweet charity. A
careful scrutiny of the President's budget cuts indicates that the assault on social welfare programs is not
as all-encompassing as partisan rhetoric sometimes
suggests, but extreme care must be taken in seeing to it
that in the Administration's program taken whole
(social welfare policies pl us overall effects of monetary
and fiscal policy), the poor, black and white alike, not
wind up a net losers.
On two other is ues in dispute between civil rights
leaders and the Administration- busing and quota we think the Administration is clearly in the right.
History may well record that the wor t error the modern
civil right movement (the NAACP in particular) e er
made wa to inve t so much of its time energy, and
moral fervor in such a dubious cause as chool bu ing.
The attempt to require racial balance in the chool
(busing may originally have been intended as a mean
to end segregation, but it quickly became an in trument
of forced integration) lacked either a mas con tituenc
or a plau ible rationale. Most parents black and white
The Cresset

As sophisticated political strategists, most civil rights leaders understand that achievement
of the things they want will depend on forging alliances with sympathetic non-black groups.

were reluctant to send their children out of their neighborhoods to attend distant schools, especially when
those schools were perceived, often correctly, as educationally inferior or even physically dangerous. Those
who favored busing were seldom those whose own
children were involved.
No one ever explained why racial balance was necessary to achieve decent education for black children,
and the apparent assumption that those children could
only learn effectively in the presence of some critical
mass of white children understandably struck many
blacks as condescending at best. Busing wasted money
that would better have been spent in classrooms; it
created unnecessary racial and class divisions; and,
after all that, it wound up failing anyway: one school
system after another on which busing was imposed resegregated itself through white flight. The current
Congressional attempt to legislate the end of courtordered busing is constitutionally irresponsible, but
the blame for it rests as much on an arbitrary and absolutist judiciary as on opportunistic politicians. Wellintentioned people supported busing because it seemed
a symbol of a noble end; seldom has the price of symbolic politics been so high.
To treat the issue of quotas satisfactorily would require more space than is here available. Our brief
treatment must begin with precise definition: affirmative action need not, though in practice it often does,
imply a system of quotas. No one can reasonably object
to efforts to seek out qualified members of minority
groups for educational or occupational advancement,
nor is it wrong that disadvantaged minorities be offered special training or remedial opportunities to
improve their levels of qualification. But when affirmative action shades into quotas, when efforts to
make equality of opportunity more meaningful get
transformed into demands for mandated equality of
condition, then legitimate objections arise.
Quota systems do require reverse discrimination,
as the Bakke case clearly demonstrated, and those thus
discriminated against are in many cases themselves
members of ethnic groups that can in no reasonable
way be classified among the privileged classes in America. The idea that advancement in our society should
come without regard to attributes of ancestry, class,
or religion stand at the very heart of the American
idea and attempts to remedy prior violation of that
ideal through a system of group rights that impo es
new modes of discrimination while it subverts the ideal
itself make no moral sense. Acts of racial discrimina~on require compensation, but the basis for judgment
In uch ca es should, in equity, be specific and indiidual, and not simply a mark of color. Quotas often
work in favor of those in minority group lea t likely
April, 1982

to have been victims of educational or occupational
discrimination. Black applicants to law and medical
chools, after all, like their white counterparts, tend
to come from the middle cla s, not from depressed urban slums.
What all the e controver ies b tween the Reagan
Administration and its civil right critics add up to, we
think, is a considerable amount of genuine disagreement compounded by ignificant do e of misund rstanding and mutual incomprehen ion. (We pa over
here the matter of th tax-ex mpt status of chools
that practice some form of di crimination. The Administration handled thi v ry badly, but inc it ha introduced legislation to forbid in law th tax benefits
formerly denied by IR r gulation th r s m to be
no substantial point of disagre ment.) What ver ide
one takes on these particular i ue , th r r main th
larger que tion of wh re the civil rights mov m nt
goes from here and what politi al trat gi it follow
in getting where it want to go.
It strikes us a a po itive d velopm nt that advocat
of black power appear I
dominant in th black ommunity than they once wer . Th point, f our e, i
not that black hould he itate to mobiliz
am
forms of political and conomi inOuenc that other
groups have put tog ther to a -or force-th ir way
into the American main tream. But black p wer a interpreted by, say, a tokely Carmi hael
m d a all
for separate development that, how v r r mantically
attractive as a manif to of indep nd nc , could only
be ultimately lf-d f ating in a o i ty that i almo t
90 per cent non-bla k. Image of "bla k pow r" r
"white power" polariz th
i ty dang r u ly; th y
are al o fal e in th ir ug tion of m nolithicallyopposed entitie . Tuer i no "whit power" in Am rica
becau e no cohe iv whit community xi t .
As ophi ticat d political trat i t mo t ivil right
leaders under tand that a hi v m nt of the thing
they want will dep nd on for ing allianc with ympathetic non-black group . That i th b ginning of political wi dom, but it may b that th kind of coalition envi ioned fail to co r th full rang of int r t
and ituation r pre nt d in th black community.
When civil righ lead r p ak of allian
with other
groups, they t nd to do o in t rm only of left-wing
cla politic .
In it extrem form uch talk mploy imag of
ocial tran formation and of a whol n word r of thing .
typical r c nt propo al ima in d a political program
ba ed on mas ive n w go ernm nt anti-pov rty program , olidarity with Third W rld lib ration mov ment , and d velopm nt at local 1 1 of alt rnative
to capitali m. How v r on r a t p r onally to uch a
vi ion, it i clear that it i not on likely to hav wide
5

America is predominantly a middle-class society, and any political or social movement
that does not recognize that-and act accordingly-will condemn itself to ultimate futility .

appeal for the American public, and coalitions based
upon it will have little prospect of political success.
Even more moderate versions of this brand of politics
tend to frame their programs along lines that exclude
middle-class concerns (inflation, erime, social instability) and that restrict their constituency entirely to
the poor, the unemployed, and other social victims.
To some extent, of course, this is inevitable. Given
the concentration of so many blacks at the bottom of
the socioeconomic structure, any political program put
together by black organizations that ignored the concerns of the disadvantaged would be both unrealistic
and morally culpable. Yet two matters need always to
be kept in mind in this regard. First, as we have already
noted, it is not necessarily true that government social
welfare programs provide the only or even the best
route to economic improvement for the poor. (New
Deal social programs put a floor on the sufferings of
the working class during the Depression, but they were
not the engine of the postwar prosperity that lifted the
working class to comparative affluence.) And that matter quite aside, it is simply inaccurate to assume, as so
much of the civil rights movement's rhetoric tends to
do, that all black people are poor and dependent.
There is now a large black middle class composed
of millions of people whose problems and possibilities
can no longer be defined within the old categories of
poverty, oppression, and powerlessness. The black
community is not a monolith, and it seems politically
self-defeating for it to act as if it were. Is it not possible
for civil rights organizations to maintain their commitment to those within the black community who have
not made it and yet begin to address themselves as well
to the concerns of those who have? America is predominantly a middle-class society, and any political
or social movement that does not recognize that-and
act accordingly-will condemn itself to ultimate futility.
Not all black people are social victims, and a truly
comprehensive black politics will have to go beyond
the assumptions and stances that the theory of victimization imposes. Our history demonstrates, as in the
case of Jews and Orientals, that there is room in the
interstices of American society for oppressed minority
groups to make a place for themselves and begin the
long ascent out of their oppressed status. Black Americans, who have suffered quantitatively and qualitatively
as no other group has, have nonetheless begun that
ascent, and it is time more notice were taken of that by
black and white alike.
To move out of victim status is to get beyond the
mood and rhetoric of hopelessness, resentment, and
comfortable (but ineffectual) moralism that can keep
individuals and groups trapped in their own sense of
futility. It may provide psychological comfort to dwell
6

on charges of "racism" or "social meanness," but it would
not seem to be very socially useful. (The once-searing
term "racist" has been so cheapened by casual and inappropriate use that it has almost entirely lost its capacity to shock, outrage, or shame.) Only a fool would
deny that prejudice still exists and still inflicts social
and economic damage, but it is not the all-devouring
monster it once was, and it no longer has the power it
formerly had to condemn virtually all blacks to lives
devoid of broad social decency.
Black people today hold more of their fate in their
own hands than ever before, which makes it appropriate for such black social critics as the brilliant economist
Thomas Sowell to emphasize internal elements of black
culture, rather than external elements of white attitudes, in assessing the condition of the black community
today. When Sowell and others include matters of family
instability, social indiscipline, and educational unpreparedness in accounting for the economic plight of
poor blacks, they are not involved, as is so often charged,
in a process of "blaming the victim." They are rather
attempting a realistic analysis of those elements within
the black community itself that contribute to the agonies
it endures. (Those who would dismiss Sowell as an unrepresentative conservative might note that the Reverend Jesse Jackson of PUSH, whom no one has accused
of conservative leanings, has been saying many of the
same things Sowell does for some time now.)
It is time our discussion of racial matters got beyond
certain taboos or habits of self-censorship. Those who
insist, for example, on identifying concern over the
crime rate in the black community as a cover ("code
word") for racism inhibit necessary conversation on a
critical issue. Black crime hurts blacks more than it
does whites, since more of it is visited on blacks, but
it is a matter of general community concern not only in
itself, but also for its poisonous contribution to racial
antagonisms. It is not too much to say that the major
feeling most whites have toward blacks today, especially
young male urban blacks, is not hatred or indifference,
but fear. That fear, and what it does to our racial attitude , needs to be talked about much more openly than
it now is.
But it is not, in the end, with the feelings or fears of
whites that discussion of civil rights issues should preoccupy itself. It is rather with black people themselves,
what they want, and how they might, with the help of
the rest of us, go about getting it. And that means talking
about the political economy and how it really works,
and how the concerns and programs of the old liberalism might be blended with certain new, possibly even
conservative, remedies to create, not the racial paradise that it makes no sense yet to dream of, but a livable
and decent society.
Cl
The Cresset

The Quest for Quality
A Christian Approach to the Liberal Arts
Larry J. Alderink
Can any praise be worthy of the Lord's majesty? How magnificent his strength! How inscrutable his wisdom! Humans
are your creatures, Lord, and their instinct is to praise you.
They bear about themselves the mark of death, the sign of
their own si"n, to remind them that you thwart the proud. But
still, since they are part of your creation, they wish to praise
you. The thought of you stfrs them so deeply that they cannot
be content unless they praise you, because you made us for
yourself and our hearts find no peace unti"l they rest in you.
St. Augustine

I.

THE

SES OF K OWLEDGE

Thesis # 1: that knowledge is not onl an end in itself, but
also serves an end beyond itself.

You could attach pn:Ces to thoughts. Some cost a lot, some a
little. And how does one pay for thoughts? The answer, I
think, is: wi"th courage.
Ludwi"g Wittgenstein

fr m
In this paper I want to ask: What draws us to engage in
liberal arts, and to do that to the best of our ability?
What propels us to commit ourselves to liberal arts and
to commit ourselves with thoughtfulness and vitality?
I will first indicate some possible reasons for seeking
knowledge, next venture a suggestion regarding the
character of knowledge, then consider a way of connecting knowledge and action, and finally propose a way of
thinking about criteria against which quality or degrees
of it can be measured.
In order to get started, we may assume a tentative definition of quality to guide us: quality is what is done
with what is available, with regard to certain standards.
After all, we ought to pursue quality. We who study here
should strive for excellence. What do we say to tho e
who join us? One thing we say is that knowledge is worth
eeking and worth having.

pur uit and v n
d ply r wardin
transmission f kn wl' and h r failur
n mi tak may b a
id th p 1f
nd

Larry J. Alderink is Associate Professor of Religion at Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota. He earned his B.A.
at Calvin College, his B.D. at Calvin Seminary, and his M.A.
and Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. He is the author of
Creation and alvation in Ancient Orphism and has written articles on ancient Greek religion for Religiou tudi
Review and umen. This paper was origi"nally prepared for
internal discussion at Concordia College, and is publ£shed
here because the issues it addresses concern Christian higher
educati"on in general.
April, 1982
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The task of learning cannot be merely to systematize findings or organize predictions. The task of
learners is to compete with each other so that both the weaker and the stronger case may be heard.

incompatible hypothesis. Frequently we can learn the
features of an idea by contrasting two or more ideas
rather than by using the idea to interpret phenomena.
A further reason to entertain inco·m patible and conflicting theories is that there are few if any theories
which comport perfectly with all known facts the theories purport to explain. Consequently, the task oflearning cannot be merely-if at all- to systematize findings
or to organize predictions. Rather, the task of learners is
to compete with each other in order that both the weaker and the stronger case may be heard. Such clashes and
competition mean that both internal and external criticism move learners beyond acquiring information and
dividing into schools of opinion; even gathering information is an activity contaminated by theory and
even by interest.
Occasionally a whole body of theories is called into
question. Sometimes centers do not hold and things fall
apart. Those are exciting times, for we catch a glimpse
of a third reason for seeking knowledge: ideolog£cal.
Normally we are trained in disciplines by learning to
ask particular questions in particular ways. Progress is
made by asking conventional questions because we have
conventional questions to ask. Without conventions,
standards could not exist, and a scholar in one city could
not understand a paper by another scholar in a different
city. But when fundamental questions-those lying at
the bottom of a discipline or a group of disciplinesare changed, a radical change is under way.
Here a basic shift occurs: conventional or normal
questions and procedures no longer produce results
because the conditions which make them fruitful and
productive have changed. What was once normal or
paradigmatic becomes antiquarian (unless someone revives it). U ually such a basic shift happens when one of
two conditions obtain: when new discoverie occur so
rapidly that an existing set of theories cannot account
for them, or when a discipline calcifies becaus it po tulates are incapable of extension or development.
Such times of crisis permit u to ee that the pursuit
of knowledge is not an end in it elf. or do inquirer
give up on knowledge when they find their per pective
undergoing radical change; they become excited anew
and scurry to learn new ways to learn. Having and undermining convention feed into the ideological u e
of knowledge. We come to think about thinking.
By "ideological u e of knowledge" I mean that knowledge is used to serve the purposes and intere ts of a
class or a group. I also mean to say that purpose and
interest are always involved in seeking knowledge, although this use may be concealed from time to time and
in one way or another. There is, of course, a wide range
in interests and groups. One class might be the working
class which, by uniting would have nothing to lose but
8

its ch ains. Another might be capitalists who by diversifying and internationalizing would be able to p erpetu ate
their hold on markets and means of production. In any
case, a school such as Concordia claims its own ideological interest (indeed, proclaims it!):
The purpose of Concordia College is to influence the affairs of the
world by sending into society thoughtful and informed men and
women dedicated to the Christian life.

If it is the case that knowledge does serve the interests
of a group or a class, and if Concordia College explicitly
announces that ideological purpose, one well may wonder about the connection between knowledge and interest, between knowledge and the purposes it serves. We
may even ask what knowledge is.

II.

THE CHARACTER OF KNOWLEDGE

Thesis #2: that knowledge is not defined by some universal
standard and does not have a perspective-invariant meaning,
but is determined by the perspective in which it is embedded
and the ideolog£cal purpose it intends to serve.

Of course knowledge is not some free-floating entity,
self-contained and absolute, which is there for us to
grab and to ingest. Before having knowledge or talking
about it, we must create it since it isn't there for the
plucking like apples on a tree. Knowledge is something
knowers have. Knowledge is something selves have,
and before having it, create it. One might expect that
since there are different views of what selves are, each
view of selves would include its own account of knowers
and knowledge.
If it is the case that "knowledge" is not to be given a
perspective-invariant meaning, and if the meaning of
"knowledge" is related to a view of human selfhood and
particularly self-as-knower, it behooves us to consider
what may be a useful and valuable construct of the two.
On the one hand, one might hold that the root of many
if not most of the problems in human life can be traced
to our lack of knowledge. Where ignorance is considered
to be our problem, knowledge is rightly held to be the
olution. On this view, we ought to have great faith in
reason for it will further the march from superstition to
enlightenment, from bondage to nature to harnessing
natures force for human good, from enslavement to
liberation. On thi view, education is redemptive, if not
redemption itself!
On the other hand, one might think it important to
mine the Christian tradition for another tarting point.
At the core of the Christian tradition lie the claim that
human being are related to God- and that this relation
has embedded in it certain re pon ibilities and obligation . The claim i that we human are o constituted a
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Humans prefer themselves as their own norm . Unfortunat ely reason does not escape the Fall;
something of reason is lost or battered, for it as well as other human t r aits is r ender ed defective.

to bear certain duties. We are responsible to God for
acting in ways appropriate for humans to act with regard to their Creator. To the Creator for creation we are
in duty bound to thank, praise, serve, and obey God.
From this primary responsibility is derived the belief
that we have two further responsibilities. We are responsible to our fellow humans to act with regard to
each other's potential (i.e., not to squander the best in
us or to betray our capabilities, but to strive for human
fulfillment; not to seek domination of one group or
gender over another, but to strive for liberation of us
all). We are responsible to nature for acting in ways
appropriate for humans to act with regard to the world
around us as custodians and tewards.
One Christian tradition calls these responsibilities a
"cultural mandate." Another tradition speaks of vocation and includes economic and political orders as well
as the ecclesiastical order. The goal is to exerci e vocation or calling whatever the station may be in the orders
of creation, the interconnected and interdependent patterns, which are the world. In both cases, th di tinction
between sacred and secular realms of life tends to be
obliterated. The task which comes with being born human, then, is the ta k to engage in cultural activity: to
make the world a habitation fit for human living, to
humanize the world, to make the world a home.
Frequently this task and these respon ibiliti s are
called the "image of God": only human beings bear a
creative resemblance to their Creator, and only human
beings have the capacity to create as their Creator
created them, and thus reflect their Creator's likeness.
What else could be the norm for being human: called
to obey and to love the rules which specify our responibilities to God-the very responsibilities which reveal
our creaturely character, the very rules which are neither imposed on us by a dictatorial deity nor yet alien
to our deepe t nature? Where else could we look for enjoyment but to the discharging of our responsibilitie to
God-in-the-world, with our fellow humans? As earthling , a brothers and si ters to the beasts and bird , w
et reflect the Creator of all reality. On thi vi w, cultural activity i neither redemptive nor casual· learning
and knowledge belong to us merely becau e we ar
created.
Beyond creation, Chri tians hold, lie a Fall. Regrettably and unfortunately and in freedom and knowled e human being lo e their grip on their tatu . t
th ame time that we lo e hold of God, we lo hold on
our elves· in becoming alien to God we becom alien
to our elve and to each other; in mis ing what we ar
aimed at we come al o to dislike and even to de pi
our fellow creature , the birds of the air and th b a t
of the field and the fields them elve . All mann r of vil
i unlea bed ome of which i vi ible e en toda . Rather
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than tru tful ob dienc , rebellion against r pon ibilitie become characteri tic- mutilation rather than teward hip for nature domination and victimization
rather than human dev lopm nt for our elv
and urrogate gods rather than creativ reflection of th tru
God.
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We should understand that faith is neither the lord nor master of our being. '"Having
faith" does not provide the solution to moral, social, political, or scientific dilemmas.

ly, education is not in and of itself redemptive. Because of our fallen condition reason itself stands in
need of redemption, both in its operations and in
its purposes.
2.

3.

that faith is neither the lord nor master of our
being. "Having faith" does not provide the solution
to moral , social , political , or scientific dilemmas.
Frequently, faith is understood to be believing that
God has saved one's soul for eternal salvation, with
the consequence that only faith should provide
answers for worldly affairs, or that one's life-in-theworld is largely a matter of indifference. Such a notion of faith severs faith from the activity of created
beings which is the focus of divine redemption, and
makes salvation exclusively an other-worldly
matter.
that Creation and Redemption focus essentially on
the world as we know it, on the world in which we
live. The created world is the world God made and
the redeemed world is the world God redeems. Although Redemption includes more than this world,
it certainly involves a view of restoring the world
to the intentions God had in creating it and of recovering what was lost or rendered defective by the
Fall.

4.

that scholarship and education have to do with the
object of Creation and Redemption: the world. To
subordinate Creation to Redemption would result
in holding that Christians have more skill or intelligence or some other advantage which non-Christians lack, with the consequence that Christian
scholarship and education are by virtue of being
Christian superior to other forms of scholarship
and education. In distinction, because scholars and
learners from a wide spectrum of perspectives seek
to understand and interpret and order the creation,
it is the quality and persuasiveness of reasons, arguments, interpretations, theories, and constructs
which mu t compete with each other. In other
words, the academic disciplines have to do with the
first article of the Creed; for Christians, the activitie
are influenced by the second article of the Creed in
an explicit and acknowledged fashion.

5.

that there is an ultimate good, a summum bonum
which human beings typically seek. Clearly, a general order of things or a cosmic pattern which beckons us to pursue certain ends cannot be some merely
external order· were it merely external , we could
neither know it nor seek it. Nor could such a general order be imposed on us by some being external
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to us; were that the case, whatever claimed to be our
highest good couldn't be our highest good. Hence,
our highest good and a general meaning of things
must be found, if it is to be found at all, in what
humans typically and characteristically seek and do.
To begin with what is characteristically sought in
particular situations does not exclude what is general or universal; indeed, what is typically sought
suggests a general seeking. This, I hold, is what
Christianity designates service to God whose particular term is the renewal of human life and the
liberation of human beings from the enslavement
in which they exist.
III.

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

Thesis #3: that knowledge is related to action by way of
world-making or enterprise or work.

To this point I have tried to indicate a source to which
some educators can turn for an answer to the question:
what do we have to work with? That source, I think, is
found in the Creation-Fall-Redemption view of human
existence. That, as I suggested, helps us partially answer the question of quality in education. We should
now venture an answer to a second question: what to do?
Obviously, human beings in general and students or
learners in particular do all sorts of things. But if we
begin with the assumption that our doing has a telos or
a goal, we may inquire into certain tendencies or dispositions which are fit for the telos. And if we assume a
coherence between a telos and our well-being or eudaimonia, we may ask about those tendencies or dispositions
which conduce towards the goal.
Developing tendencies is clearly instrumental to acting in responsible ways. Truth-seeking and truth-telling,
justice, courage, creativity, curiosity, reflection, all
these qualities and many others are instrumental to and
indeed produce the goal of well-being. Conversely,
lying, theft, betrayal, and other similar qualities detract
from well-being, even though they may bring pleasure
or wealth or fame. But the virtuous tendencies and the
vicious tendencies are not only instrumental; a life
characterized by virtuous tendencies is inherently worth
living, whereas a life marked by vicious tendencies is the
worst life conceivable or possible.
One might speak of the soul or personhood to identify those features which make one most truly oneself.
We might picture human souls or persons as twisted
and crooked by their habits and pursuits, or, alternately,
as happy and joyful in living well. Here we have a kind
of self-reflection on what matters mo t to people, on the
center from which people live and act. The self-knowledge produced by such reflection constitutes knowing
The Cresset

It has long been argued by c ritics that religion is a disease of language, a
disease which prompts people to say what cannot be said or to utter the unutterable.

who one is and being true to oneself, and taking responsibility for one's most fundamental beliefs; at the
opposite of self-knowledge stands ignorance, or not
knowing what is second-hand and bogu and shallow in
oneself.
Frequently such a picture is thought to be subjective.
Is the picture-including the values, beliefs, dispositions, and behavior which are features of the picture a matter of choice, in which case it cannot be thought to
be true or false, good or bad, or anything in between?
Is the picture a matter of feeling or taste, in which case
one reaches bottom when one says, "That's the way I
feel, and that's that"?
It is frequently held, on the other hand, that there are
some areas of life which are not matters of choice or
feeling. These areas are those where science yields
knowledge. Here the self isn't the proper object of
knowledge; the world is. Here the proper procedure is
not self-reflection and the yield self-knowledge; the
proper procedure consists of techniques which can be
used by other researchers and experiments which can
be repeated by others to obtain the same result .
So we often conclude that self-knowledge is personal
and subjective, whereas world-knowledge is impersonal
and objective. By and large, the humanities deal with
humans and the sciences with the world and observable
behavior of objects of the world. Somehow, on this view,
humans are more apart from the world than they are a
part of it-rather like lords and ladies who divide
among themselves their respective tasks.
A view common in our century is that a wide gap does
exist between subjective and objective, between human
and non-human, between humanities and sciences. One
famous author has even written of "two cultures" and a
growing rift between them. A clear expression of such a
view is found in Freudian psychology, to which we owe
one of the most pervasive images of what it means to be
human beings. It would seem, from this per pective,
that humans are divided into two parts and inhabit two
worlds. During the day we live in a real world where
law of motion are regularly followed, where wishe mu t
be harnessed for the purposes uf civilization, where the
laws of life and death are inexorable. But at night we
enter another world in which our wishes enable us to
travel to distant continents without so much as packing
a suitcase or purchasing a plane ticket, in which dead
people can return to us for visits, and undesired event
can be willed away.
On this view, our scientific beliefs and value entitl
u to view with superiority people from other times and
places. Science has replaced religion a a way of explaining the world; if religion i to urvive in the modern
world, it mu t focus on ethics, aesthetics, or p ychology
(having nothing worth saying about the world) or b
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The point is not to strive for objectivity in the sense of value-free inquiry, and even less
to think of education as encouraging student s to set aside their values when they think.

If we think of human beings as reflecting their Creator, we come to think of human beings as actors or doers,
and in acting and doing they create. World-making is
seen as one of our chief activities. On this view, the
world is both given and possible; possible, that is, to be
made and remade in different ways. When we awaken
on a given morning, we don't leave one world and enter
another. What confronts us is what we made the day before, and some of it is worth continuing as we project a
future, but some of it is rubbish we should clear away
because it isn't worth keeping and· using for the future.
It isn't helpful, then, to think in terms of subjective vs.
objective or reality vs. illusion or even humanities vs.
science. It is more helpful to think in terms of making
and creating. When the world is to be made and remade,
we are driven to ask evaluative questions: what is worth
discarding? what is worth retaining? what is worth projecting into the future?
The point, then, is not to strive for objectivity in the
sense of value-free inquiry, and even less to think of
education as encouraging students to set aside their
values when they think. The point is, however, to strive
for objectivity in the sense that competing viewpoints,
alternative hypotheses, and disconfirming data be entertained and even sought. Further, rational activity
can lead to illusions as well as models, and dreams and
even hunches and free association can lead to models
as well as illusions.
Perhaps we shouldn't consider reason as the arbiter
of claims to knowledge, or theology as a cultural overseer, or philosophy as keeping all the other disciplines
honest by informing them of properly grounded and
unproperly grounded claims to knowledge. Perhaps we
shouldn't think of reason as a mirror reflecting the
grime and confusions of experience, but itself a clear
master of truth and falsity, of meaning and purpose.
Perhaps we should think of humans as makers and creators reflecting their Creator's nature and using all their
capacities.
Lived experience and formal analysis go together,
and reason is one aspect of the process. This is the starting point of creative work in any area- academic or
non-academic-although the products of the work vary
significantly. Yet in art or science, religion or history,
the focus is on creating. In an educational institution,
this means something considerably more than transmitting knowledge. It means creating knowledge. It
means considerably more than the consuming of knowledge; it means producZ:ng knowledge. Were transmitting
knowledge the core of teaching and learning, a one-way
treet would be the ideal: from teacher to student, the
teacher giving and the student receiving. The receivers
are asked to engage in a passive activity, but the teachers are somehow beyond that, occupying like Olympians
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a position of superiority. Here the givers are in a moral
bind, that of asking their students to do something they
themselves find unnecessary or refuse to do: learn.
But if both students and teachers are engaged in the
same process of learning, both are active in the same
process and in the same pursuit: desiring and striving
for what is beyond both, viz., knowledge. On this view,
it is not so much wonder as eros which propels toward
knowledge; it is also eros which moves us to renounce
the superiority which comes with the assumption of
possessing knowledge and to assert the need to search
for knowledge.
Clearly there is no reason to hide our ignorance as
we engage in the search for knowledge and truth. Indeed, our ignorance is both the starting point and the
spur which drives us to knowledge. Nor is there any
reason to assume that we do our work without assumptions. Indeed, the recognition of our assumptions liberates us to attend to the tasks set before us. On this
view, our assumptions as Christians and as scholars are
not to be repressed or eliminated, but rather given room
to make their operations effective.
IV.

STANDARDS FOR QUALITY

Thesis #4: that standards of quality are derived from disc,:plinary work rather than from Christianity or Christian
theology.

With the religious principle of Creation-Fall-Redemption I have tried to answer two questions. What do
we have or what is available? Not, I suggest, ignorant
(i.e., non-knowing) human beings who require knowledge for their redemption, but created and fallen and
redeemed beings for whom the bondage-freedom or
servility-freedom dialectic is definitive or constitutive.
What do we do? Not, I suggest, strive for self-actualization or to be good members of society, but develop certain tendencies and discharge our responsibilities, and
therein find our enjoyment and full stature as human
beings. Not, I suggest by dividing our experience and
world into reality and illusion and the disciplines into
sciences and humanities, but by education toward the
renewal of life and the remaking of the world.
I have argued that we as learners ought to hold certain beliefs or ideas as assumptions, and that we should
foster and develop these ideas in our learning- or that
all learners ought to nurture the ideas and develop
them in our studies. I have also argued that we should
act on the basis of these assumptions or presuppositions
-specifically as learners, we ought in disciplinary and
interdi ciplinary activities to create, to construct ideas
and to make theories, to create knowledge to serve the
purpose of renewing human life and remaking the
The Cresset

In fundamentalist circles, a stock storehouse of rigidly held t heological views, supp osedly
derived from the Bible, determines educational standards for virtually all fields of inquiry.

world.
Since all ideas and acts are not of equal worth (except
to some liberals), and since hardly anyone would hold
that anything goes, how would we know whether we are
doing a mediocre, good, or excellent job? Since it makes
little sense to hold that doing one's own thing is what
matters, and since thinking that feeling good about
whatever we're doing signifies poverty-stricken standards or the absence of standards, we come to ask how we
can dispatch our responsibilities and fulfill our duties,
and in doing so find enjoyment and render gratitude
for our lives. In brief: by what standards do we measure
the quality of our efforts as learners?
A fairly common procedure is to derive standards
for quality from Christianity or Christian theology. In
fundamentalist circles, the enterprise is usually rather
vulgar but straightforward. A stock storehouse of rigid1y held theo~.ogical views, supposedly derived from the
Bible, determines the conclusions that evolution is
wrong (or "only a theory"), that Freud, Marx, and
Shakespeare have little worthwhile to say and thus
needn't be read, that moral inquiry is already a sign of
moral laxity, and that scholarly investigation of Scripture is to question the answers.
There are, in distinction, sophisticated and serious
efforts to develop a radically different view of theology
-theology as queen of the sciences. Here all or many of
the disciplines are arrayed around theology as the center, source, and goal of knowledge. Here theology is
not one of the disciplines next to other disciplines, but
the fundamental and foundational discipline.
I will not argue against either of these two viewsbut only say that the anti-intellectualism of fundamentalism is incompatible with academic life and that queens
may easily become figureheads or worse. Let me propose an alternative to both these views.
If standards for quality or criteria for excellence are
not to be derived from theology, where can we look? I
suggest that we look to the disciplines: the assumption
which found them, the procedures by which they validate and invalidate hypothese , the methods by which
re ults are obtained, the control beliefs which prompt
acceptance or rejection or modification of theorie and
direct the construction of new theories, and the goals
toward which knowledge is aimed.
It is tempting to think that it would be nice if the
state of the di ciplines and the relations among them
were coherent and if the students in the di ciplines conducted their activities with the effortles grace and poi e
of an Oxford don. It is tempting to think that it would
b nice if cholars could start anew, pre uppo e littl or
nothing, or begin afresh with only that which i elfe ident- and with a clear method reach true and c rtain
conclu ions.
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But even a glance at one's own discipline, let alone
others' disciplines, moves one to conclude that things
are in a state of di unity and disarray. Little unity of
knowledge, little methodological agreement regarding
description or explanation, little harmony regarding
goals and uses of knowledge is apparent. This i not,
however, the deplorable ituation we might initially
think it to be.
Although learning lack an ab olute starting point,
there may b omething valuable which com s with
construing th effort to get tarted a a dilemma. Knowledge is impossible if it mean
arching for what i either
known or unknown; in the fir t ca , th r i no rea on
to search becau e one know alr ady, and in the econd
case, there is no po ibility of arching b cau e on
wouldn't know what to earch for in th fir t pla . Degrees of knowl dg , how ver, are po ibl wh n th
dilemma of ignoranc -knowl d
i r plac d with th
continuum of opinion-know! dge, wh r k ptici m i
never total nor certainty attainabl and b yond d ubt.
That's the way it app ar to b in th urr nt tat of th
di ciplin : di unity i a ign f b ing in medias res. It i
precisely the lack f indubitable tartin point and
fixed and c rtain c n lu ion that maintain movem nt
in the di iplin -and mak work in at 1 a t n of
them exciting.
On the vi w I am urging n
a privileg d sanctuary. Rath r th di iplin ar a pectual or modal that i a h di iplin ab tra t from
the givenn
of th a tual world on r an th r a p t
for fo u ed att nti n. Th particular a p t or mod
which b come th f u f r att ntion do n t define
th di cipline, how v
th u h n and only on
di cipline can inquir int a parti vlar d main, fr m
which oth r di iplin ar prohibit d fr m nt rin by
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We should expect of theories or ideas at least that their terms be coherent and consistent,
for otherwise anomalies are generated which vitiate the explanatory power we seek.
nents; where fundamentalisms of either the theological
or scientific variety match swords, both sides receive
nicks, but the audience soon goes on to more interesting
contests. In other situations, the antagonism between
science and theology is reduced o:r: eliminated because
the methodological boundaries between the two render unfruitful any battle but instead invite interchange and conversation.
Leaving the discussion at this point of methodological pluralism would be equivalent to suggesting that the
disarray is not only good but the entire story. To rush to
another episode in the narrative may be arrogant and
patronizing. Let me, then, tentatively suggest that there
may be some unity not given in the beginning but dim1y perceived in the process and at least projected as a
goal or an ideal. Do we have expectations which all
theories or ideas should meet if they are to be designated good or of high quality? Likely so.
Certainly theories guide research and create data and
shape observations of phenomena selected for observation. What should we expect of theories or ideas? At
least that their terms be coherent and consistent, for
otherwise anomalies are generated which vitiate the
explanatory power we seek. In addition to internal consistency, external fruitfulness is desirable, for we expect a theory to do something a summary or a generalization doesn't do. Otherwise we satisfy ourselves with
saying that things are complex, often taken to be a sign
of profundity. Reduction to simplicity is a legitimate
and necessary desideratum of a theory or an idea.
Further, adequacy and comprehensiveness of scope
are important features of a good idea; a theory which
explains only part of the data or more than the data
begs for revision. Parsimony or elegance is also characteristic of a theory we call good; topics for explanation must be demarked, and having too many explanatory terms results in a theory which tries to do everything and actually does nothing except perhaps satisfy
some psychological or mystical need.
I haven't tried to build any theory or even theorize
about theorizing, although that is what we in our learning should do. I have tried to suggest some criteria
which good theories must meet in order to be called
good, and to show that no one discipline (be it theology
or even philosophy!) can or should lead all others or
integrate all others.
And through it all, I have assumed that underlying
our academic work (as all of human life) is a perspective or a synoptic vision or a framework we together
share, and that this standpoint can be articulated as a
set of control beliefs which can and should guide and
influence our academic activities of thinking and learning and creating ideas. Marxists and Freudians and
Buddhists and Muslims and a host of others do that,
14

drawing on their deepest convictions and commitments. Shouldn't we, too, strive for wisdom and insight?
Shouldn't we, too, fulfill our responsibilities and complete the thoughts that stir humans so deep ly?
Cl
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Considering the tremendous importance of fundamentalist religion
in American life in both the past
and present, it is remarkable how
little attention it has received from
historians, who generally delight
in tracking down such pervasive
cultural forces. Whether we like it
or not, Protestant fundamentalism
and its close ally, conservative evangelicalism, have shaped the ideas,
values, and politics of millions of
Americans during the last century,
yet historians know less about this
movement than they do about the
Greenback Party or the Townsendites. If one believes that there
should be some correlation between
the sign ificance of an hi torical
phenomenon and the attention
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George Marsden's book should become required reading
for students of American religion and culture.
given it by historians, then fundamentalism presents a ripe topic
for investigation.
Fortunately, George Marsden's
recent book, Fundamentalism and
A mer£can Culture, takes a big step
toward correcting this imbalance.
An historian at Calvin College ,
Marsden is the first really ophisticated scholar to take a close look
at the whole fundamentali t phenomenon in order to uncover it
roots and try to understand how it
became such a powerful pre ence
in American life. Although it takes
a few mis-steps and leaves plenty
of questions unanswered Fundamentalism and American Culture hould
become required reading for anyone
who wants to understand modern
American religion and culture.
As he ventures into thi vir in
intellectual territory, Mar den'
first major task is to clarify ju t
what fundamentalism is and to locate it historically. Although many
people think of any kind of trict
religiosity or moral narrowne a
"fundamentalism," and imagin
that it has always been around in
some form or another, thi i not
the case. American Prote tant
fundamentalism is actually a p cific religious movement that aro
around the turn of the century, and
bears a distinct relation hip to
American culture. Although it i a
puzzling and terribly compl x affair-at least as compl x a th
liberal Protestanti m it opp d American fundamentalism po
ses a clearly definable ori in and
outlook that mak it u ceptibl to
historical inve tigation and und rstanding.
Marsden provide a n at d efinition of fundamentali m. It i "militantly anti-mod mi. t Prot tant
evangelicalism.
were evangelical Chri tian
to the tradition of the dominant
American revivali t
tabli hm nt
of the ninete nth c ntury who in
the twentieth c ntu
militant!

opposed both modernism in theology
and the cultural changes that moderni m endorsed." Fundamentalism wa never a church or a creed,
but rather a movement, "in the n e
of a d velopment or tendency in
Christian thought that gradually
took on it own id ntity." Although
it eventually dev lop d a di tinct
life, identity, and v ntually a uhculture of its own, fundamentali m
n ver xi t d wholly indep nd ntly
of the variou other mov m nt
from which it gr wand took tr ngth.
Fundam ntali m thu app ar d
a om thing n win m ri an religion, but it~prang from om thing
much old r and d p r in m rican
xp ri nc . In th fundam ntali t '
powerful
n of conn tion with
th Am rican pa t, Mar d n a rt ,
Ii on of th k
to th ir p culiar worldvi w, th imm n importanc th y atta h d t
ultural and
moral qu tion , and th
r e lation hip with th
m ri an lif .
Lik it lib ral Pr t
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If fundamentalism was simply the defensive reaction of a dying way of life,
then it might be explained-and written off-primarily in sociological terms.
Looking back to a better time, they
felt themselves to be "internal immigrants" in an America that was
often as strange to them as it was to
newcomers from abroad. Increas.ingl y pushed into a marginal subculture outside the centers of
intellect and power, many began to
fight back against a modern society
that, they believed, had turned its
back on Christianity and lost its way:
If fundamentalism was simply the
defensive reaction of a dying way of
life, then it might be explained primarily in sociological terms-as
indeed it was so understood, and
written off, by most of its contemporary opponents. Marsden does begin
by recognizing the core of truth in
this theory. But he persuasively
argues that it is an inadequate interpretation of the whole phenomenon. It fails to explain the many
genuinely new elements in fundamentalism, and cannot account for
fundamentalism's persistence long
after America ceased to be an agrarian/small town society. Above all
it reckons without the powerful religious concerns that motivated the
fundamentalists and shaped the
character of their anti-modernist
crusade.
Marsden's history of the movement therefore shifts attention from
the sociological components of
fundamentalism to its religious impulses. In uncovering the major
emphases that went to make up
fundamentalism, Marsden in effect
provides a religious interpretation
of the origins and development of
the movement. Fundamentalism's
reaction to modern industrial society and to particular events- especially World War I-are still seen as
important, but they are more readily
understood when the fundamentalists' novel religious outlook is
taken into account. By focussing on
its religious premises, Marsden is
able to explain some otherwise baffling features of fundamentalism:
its almost schizophrenic ambiva-
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lence about America and its future,
its curious relations with the
churches, and its pronounced tension between "trust and distrust"
of reason and the intellect.
Four major religious strands were
woven into fundamentalism. These
were: Moodyite revivalism, premillennial dispensationalism, the
holiness movement, and orthodox
Calvinist-primarily Presbyterianresistance to liberal theology, especially the new Biblical scholarship. Each of these elements was to
some extent independent of fundamentalism, and their differences
often created internal tension in the
movement, but they were united in
their hostility to the enemy- modernism-and in their conviction
that they had the correct religious
answer to modern questioning.
Moodyite revivalism is the least
interesting source of fundamentalism, and therefore easy to overlook,
but Marsden shows how Moody's
work led to fundamentalism . Dwight
L. Moody himself lacked a crucial
fundamentalist quality: he disliked
controversy and considered theology
totally unimportant. But his immensely popular style of "soulsaving, world-denying evangelism"
contributed in numerous ways to
fundamentalism. Moody stood in
the long line of great American evangelistic revivalists stretching back
through Charles G. Finney, Lyman
Beecher, Timothy Dwight, and Jonathan Edwards. But unlike his illustrious predecessors, Moody was
uninterested in religious ideas and
strongly emphasized the duty of
Christians to turn away from "the
fallen world." "The world is a
wrecked vessel," he frequently proclaimed. "God has given me a lifeboat and said, 'Moody, save all you
can.'" Moody retained cordial relations with the leading Protestant
liberals throughout his life, but his
younger friends and lieutenants
formed the elite shock troops of
fundamentalism.

If Moodyism represented the simplest impulses of American religiosity, premillennial dispensationalism was one of its more exotic
products. Its complex, esoteric
doctrinal notions about the different "ages of mankind," leading
up to the coming apocalypse, are
almost impenetrable to the outsider
or novice, yet they provided much
of the framework within which fundamentalists interpreted Scripture,
history, and American culture.
Based on a fantastic reading of the
Books of Daniel and Revelation by
the British Bible commentator John
Nelson Darby (and hence sometimes
called "Darbyite premillennialism"), dispensationalism reversed
the usual American millennial
optimism and became deeply pessimistic about "the present age" or
dispensation, hostile to virtually
all efforts at "human self-improvement," and expectant of divine delivery.
Through Darby's American disciple, D. I. Scofield, premillennialism greatly affected fundamentalism
as well as such related but independent movements as the Jehovah's
Witnesses. So deep was its influence
that an earlier writer, Ernest Sandeen, virtually identified fundamentalism with dispensationalism.
Marsden considers this equation
overstated, but acknowledges that
premillennial thought provided the
most distinctive color to the fundamentalist outlook.
One of Marsden 's greatest achievements is to offer some insight into
the seemingIy strange dispensational
doctrines. His most brilliant chapter
shows the complex intellectual connections between premillennial dispensationalism and certain specific
problems that had developed for
Christian thinkers during the historically-minded nineteenth century. As Marsden notes, the ideas of
a contest between God and Satan
over human destiny culminating
in an apocalypse at the end of time
The Cresset

If the truth of God was the same for all ages, the fundamentalists reasoned, then
the Bible was the surest means permanently and precisely to display this truth.
were old religious ideas. But nineteenth-century developments in
economics, history, biology, and
geology raised acute new questions
about the nature of historical epochs
and how change occurred. Within
the context of their supernaturalist
premises and gloomy cultural stance,
the fundamentalists developed a
consistent, self-contained scheme
that could answer almost every
question about history and the world.
But in solving one set of problems,
fundamentalism made another commitment that became crucial to its
entire outlook: belief in the literal,
infallible truth of the Bible. As
Marsden notes, the Bible had long
occupied a central place in Protestant piety, and was especially rev ere d in America where church
authority was weak and religion
highly personal. In its search for
a religious authority that could
stem the rising tide of liberalism,
fundamentalism went one step
further and proclaimed the absolute "inerrancy" of Scripture. This
doctrine was given its first clear
expression in 1881 by A. A. Hodge
and B. B. Warfield, who asserted
that Christianity required belief
that "the Scriptures not only contain, but are the Word of God, and
hence that all their elements and all
their affirmation are absolutely errorles and binding on the faith and
obedience of men."
As Marsden observes, this view of
Biblical authority placed tremendous importance on the written word
a the guarantee of table truth
amidst the flux of time. If the truth
of God was the same for all ages,
the fundamentalists rea oned, then
the written Word of God wa the
urest mean permanently and preci ely to display thi truth. And the
obviou
ubjectivity involved in
accepting only ome parts of cripture a true gave the doctrine of inerrancy an appealing air of con i tency. But the con equence wa to
make the Bible not impl a dePn'l 1982

finitive religious authority, but a
repository of truth on all matter
it mentioned.
This view of Scripture became one
of the most distinctive feature of
American fundamentalism, and et
it apart from more experientially
or emotionally oriented form of
folk religion such as Pentecostalism. Far from being ignorant or
anti-rational, fundamentalism wa
in fact hyper-rationalistic, a it
tried to counteract the puriou evidence and reason of modern cien
with the firmer truth to be found
in the Holy Book.
But if the methods were rationalistic, the results were often wildly
eccentric. In What the Bible Teaches
(1898), the fundamentali t Biblical
writer Reuben Torrey compil d
more than three thou and "pr p
sitions" conclusively proven by th
Bible. In 1922 Moody Monthly published an argument correlating the
seven days of creation with th
seven notes in the octave, r latin
these to the even aying of Chri t
and the seven parts of Psalm 23, and
concluding "what need we of further
proof that all cripture i Godbreathed?" By this time uch fundamentali t reading wer b ing
mocked and satirized by H.

Mencken and other critics. But the
work wa uperfluous; the fundamentali t caricatured them el ve .
In a work on "Scripture numeric ,"
fundam ntalist writer Ivan Panin
claimed to have demon trated that
if one count up all the word and
I tter in any giv n
tion of th
Bihl , th total arriv d at will alway
b a multipl of ven.
fundam ntali t ma azin pr nted thi
work a "an unan werabl proof of
th divine authority of th Bihl
which no critic ha ev r dar d anw r. In om thing of an und rtatement it add d that "whil lif
rdinary Bibi
int th d
tail in foll win up thi y t m h
at d al of omry and an af 1
it ann t b di -

no
ak-
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Bibli-

Give The Cresset As A Thoughtful Gift

~I]

The Cresset

Valparaiso University
, _ _ Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
Pl a e nd on y ar (nin i
to the addr
b l w. M h
Plea

ann un

th

lat

p r

r

d.

·ub ripti n a a it fr m :

am

tr~~IL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .'tat _ _ _ _ _ _ ZIP _ _ _ __

17

By explaining the philosophical underpinning of fundamentalism, Marsden succeeds
in making it more comprehensible. But he winds up pushing his argument too far.
cism provided the theological fuel
for fundamentalism, the "holiness
movement" underlay much of its
moral and cultural activism. The
broad holiness revival of the late
nineteenth century was actually ·a
development within the Methodist
wing of American Protestantism
that had long stressed the necessity
of moral improvement or perfection in the Christian believer, an~
it led to the creation of several new
denominations such as the Pentecostalists. But one faction of the
holiness movement, particularly
influenced by the Keswick conferences in England, ended up closely
allied with the other fundamentalists. With considerable doctrinal
variation, these elements spurred
fundamentalist social and moral
crusades in such areas as vice, divorce, poverty, sabbath-keeping,
prohibition, gambling, and so on.
Marsden correctly notes that many
of these movements, such as prohibition, were not conducted by fundamentalists alone, but were carried
on by broader evangelical coalitions. But for fundamentalists they
constituted part of a general crusade against modernism, which they
saw as the source of practically every
social evil in contemporary America.
Finally, fundamentalism grew out
of the efforts of orthodox denominational scholars to prevent what they
saw as the erosion of Christian doctrine by modern culture and religious Ii beralism. These fundamentalists often had intellectual perspectives that others in the movement
lacked and made more erious
efforts to identify the new and
dangerous here ies produced by the
modern world. Exemplified on a
scholarly plane by the Princeton
theologians J. Gresham Machen and
Charles Hodge, and on a more
popular level by the twelve volumes
of The Fundamentals pu bli hed between 1910 and 1915, these conservative Protestants mounted a
counter-attack on the spreading
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Protestant liberalism by showing
how it had increasingly abandoned
various articles of orthodox Christianity. Often the major effort was
directed to defending particular
"miraculous" items of belief, such
as the creation of Adam and Eve,
the virgin birth, the descent into
hell, and the resurrection. But as
the intellectuals in the movement
understood, this was partly a tactic
to gain popular support. Their real
target was the new worldview that,
they contended, had entered the
modern world with the rise of nineteenth-century science, and that
threatened a contrary worldview
based on the Bible and Scottish
Common Sense philosophy.
Marsden demonstrates that the
more sophisticated fundamentalists
were consistent adherents of a Common Sen e philosophical tradition
that went back to the eighteenth
century. The Common Sense
thinkers held that the basic truths
about nature, man, and God were
accessible to all rational men.
Through the application of reason
to empirically demonstrable facts
about the world, the eternally sure
and valid laws of nature and nature's
God could be discerned and applied.
Although there might appear to be
a considerable gap between ordinary
experience and reason and Christian
dogma, the Common Sen e tradition
solved the difficulty at one stroke by
making the Bible an equally valid
repository of nece sary factual truth.
As Charles Hodge stated in his volume Systematic Theology:
If natural science be concerned with the
facts and law of nature, theology is concerned with the facts and principles of the
Bible. If the object of the one be to arrange
and ystematize the facts of the external
world , and to ascertain the laws by which
they are determined , the object of the other
is to sy tematize the fact of the Bible, and
ascertain the principle or general truths
which tho e facts involve.

Since the word of Scripture like
nature, presented actual fact about
the world, and not imply ubjective

ideas subject to error, they were
equally accessible to the rational
human mind, which would discover
there the eternal laws of salvation
and morality.
By explaining this philosophical
underpinning of fundamentalism,
Marsden succeeds in making it more
comprehensible. But he goes astray
in arguing that these writers presented an intellectually defensible
alternative to the worldview emerging from modern science and
philosophy. In a crucial chapter
entitled, "Fundamentalism as an
Intellectual Phenomenon," Marsden
brings in the theories of Thomas
Kuhn to argue that fundamentalists
were not really anti-intellectual or
anti-scientific, but rather that they
operated with a different "perceptual model" of the universe. The
fundamentalists, Marsden contends,
were operating with the Baconian
and Newtonian paradigms that had
dominated Western science until the
mid-nineteenth century, when they
were replaced by first Darwinian
and then Einsteinian paradigms.
Hence the fundamentalists could
claim, legitimately, that they were
not opposed to cience as such:
Rather, they were judging the standards
of the later scientific revolution by the
standard of the first-the revolution of
Bacon and ewton. In their view. cience
depended on fact and demonstration. Darwinism, o far as they could see, was based
on neither. The larger objection, of cour e,
was that the evolutionary approach to the
interpretation of biology and history took
only natural causes into account . to the
total exclu ion of the supernatural.

This is an intriguing line of defense, but it will not hold up.
However valid Kuhn theory is in
explaining cientific tran formations, it cannot buttre the fundamentalist position. Even by ewton's
time, phy ical science had ad anced
far beyond the simple 'fact-demontration-law' model imagined by
the fundamentali ts. Much of e" tonian phy ic for example, re ted
on highl complex po tulate about
The Cresset

Fundamentalists were excluded from the temples of science not because they held
to different scientific paradigms, but because they were not scientists at all.
the nature of time and space that
were far removed from "common
sense." As Newton himself says in
the Principia, "The common people
conceive those quantities (time,
space, place, and motion) under no
other notions but from the relation
they bear to sensible objects. And
thence arise certain prejudices, for
the removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish them .... "
Even if the fundamentalists were
as devoted to Baconian and Newtonian science as Marsden suggests
(and his evidence on this point is
not convincing), this was probably
because science until Darwin could,
without too many intellectual gymnastics, be reconciled with a Scriptural worldview. But with Darwin
the gap became too great-or at
least greater than could be bridged
by any intellectual system as
simple as Common Sense philosophy. This was not only because the
intellectual "paradigms" had
changed, but because there were new
scientific facts which were incompatible with fundamentalist assumptions. Confronted with such facts,
the good scientist suspends judgment and begins the search for
explanations. But the fundamentalists instead reached for the hymnal.
They thus more nearly resembled
those in the Papal court who refused to look through Galileo's
telescope than they did Bacon or
ewton.
In explaining how the fundamentalists lost intellectual authority,
Marsden comes do e to endorsing
the fundamentalist charge that there
was some sort of conspiracy against
fundamentalist "scientists," and that
Darwinian cientist were ju t as
dogmatic" and biased as their opponent .
on-Darwinist . of cour e. were o tracized
from cientific circle . imilarl , the modern
theological community adopted a model for
truth that in effect tigmatized theologian
who rejected evolutionary view a n ith r
cientific nor legitimate theologian . The
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conservatives were equally dogmatic. No
compromise could be made with a worldview whose proponents denied the fixed
character of supernaturally guaranteed
truth . Communication between the two
sides became impossible. Fundamentalists ,
excluded from the community of modern
theological and scientific orthodoxy , eventually were forced to establish their own
community and sub-culture in which their
own ideas of orthodoxy were pre erved .

But such attempts to put modern
scientists and fundamentalists on
the same intellectual plane are
doomed to failure. Fundamentali t
were not excluded from the tempi
of science because they held to different scientific paradigms, but b cause they were not scientists at all ,
and refused to accept the e ential
premises of a scientific worldview
in approaching nature. One can,
perhaps, respect the courage of
those who reject those premi es,
but not their complaints about b ing
shut out of the prestigious scientific enterprises.

Marsden denies that the
fundamenta lists were
truly anti-intellectual.

basic matters. One suspects that had
they been there, fundamentalists
would have walked out of Peter Abelard's clas rooms in the twelfth
century.
Especially ignificant in this regard is the fundamentalists' complete
inability to cope not imply with
the conclu ion but with the ba ic
question rai ed by the n w Biblical
criticism em rging from G rmany at
th
Whil
fundamentali t

hi h r riti i m, but that th y did
not und r tand it, and did n t want
t und r tand it.
Whil th

Marsden's attempted rehabilitation of fundamentali m's anti-Darwinism goes along with hi g n ral
defense of fundamentali t a ain t
the charge of being anti-int ll tual.
Insofar as it refute caricatur of
all fundamentali ts a imply mind-

iou
little in Mar d n' a
n-

was anti-int lle tual in thi
though the fundam ntali t
m diate fo wa tw nti thmoderni m, man of th m
r ally to ha
obj t d to an kind
of qu tionin or un rtaint ab
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Fundamentalism suffered a great defeat in the Scopes trial. But it did not, as is
often thought, disappear. It licked its wounds and prepared to fight another day.
found when he was invited to address the Winona Bible Conference:
"Practically every lecture, on whatever subject," he reported, "was
begun by the singing of some of the
popular jingles, often accompanied
by the blowing of enormous horns
or other weird instruments of music."
Just as he underestimates the folk
element in fundamentalism, Marsden may insufficiently stress its
appeal as popular entertainment.
Along with its serious work of
saving souls, American revivalism
had always been in the business of
putting on a good show. Moody's
revivals were, among other things,
impressively staged productions,
carefully calculated to have the proper emotional effect on the audience,
and his fundamentalist successors
were also well-versed in the show-biz
tricks of their trade. It was no accident that the second best-known
fundamentalist leader of the early
twentieth century was Billy Sunday,
whose previous occupation had been
that of a major league baseball player.
The switch from the outfield to the
revival stump may have required
different skills, but there was no
need to change the essential knack
of pleasing the crowd.
The best known fundamentalist
leader, of course, was William Jennings Bryan. A three-time presidential candidate and Secretary of
State of the United States, Bryan
had developed a great mass following as a politician, and American
politicians, too, have often been as
much in the business of entertainment as of government. Bryan
brought his gifts of oratory and
phrasemaking from the campaign
trail to the sawdust trail. "It is better
to trust the Rock of Ages," he told
delighted crowds, "than to know the
age of rocks." Bryan's rise to leadership of the fundamentalist movement coincided with its increasing
politicization after World War I,
when, for a variety of reasons, fundamentalists made organized efforts
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to gain control of major Protestant
denominations and to translate their
views into law, especially in the public school systems. Playing for high
stakes, the fundamentalists waged a
determined battle that, in Marsden's
judgment, fell just short of winning
control of the mainline churches.
But those who lived by the sword
of publicity could also die by it. The
Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee,
in 1925 was great theater, with two
superb performers, Bryan and Clarence Darrow, playing their parts to
perfection. But Bryan ended up as
second banana. I have always thought
Bryan the much more humanly
sympathetic figure at Dayton, and
some of his summations about the
consequences of a purely materialistic age were genuinely moving.
But Darrow, cheered on by an even
greater American publicist, H. L.
Mencken, showed Bryan up for a fool.
When Bryan died on the Sunday
after the trial, Mencken's obituary
for him was also taken by many as
an obituary for the supposedly backwoods phenomenon of fundamentalism. It was appropriate, Mencken
observed, that Bryan had spent his
last days in a "one-horse Tennessee
village," because Bryan loved all
country people, including the
"gaping primates of the upland valleys. He delighted in greasy victuals
of the farmhouse kitchen, country
smells, and the tune of cocks crowing on the dunghill." Bryan had
made the grade of a country saint.
"His place in Tennessee hagiography
is secure. If the village barber saved
any of his hair, then it is curing gallstones down there today."
Fundamentalism did suffer a great
defeat at Dayton. Its greatest popular hero had been humiliated and
ridiculed. Within a few years fundamentalists had been practically
driven out of the major northern
denominations and destroyed as a
political force in American life.
But fundamentalism did not disappear. Rather it licked its wounds

and prepared to fight another day.
As Marsden hints, and the current
research of historian Joel Carpenter
suggests, fundamentalists after 1925
simply withdrew from the national
scene in order to concentrate on
building up strength in local congregations and in informal voluntary alliances. Largely hidden from
view, fundamentalists nevertheless
retained considerable strength in
the popular religious life of the
country. The spectacular career of
Billy Graham in the post-World
War II era, for example, should
have alerted keen observers that the
fundamentalist-conservative evangelical style of religion was by no
means finished as a force in American religion and life. By the 1960s
fundamentalists were enjoying increasing wealth and confidence, and
were ready to resume old battles
on new ground. From the perspective of the 1980s, the neo-fundamentalist takeover of the Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod in 1969
might be seen as a forerunner of the
dramatic resurgence of fundamentalism in other areas of American
public life.
The recent resurgence of fundamentalism in political as well as
religious life gives Marsden's book
a timely interest not usually reserved for historical studies. In no
other modern Western nation did
this particular sort of response play
such a conspicuous and pervasive
role in the culture, and it appears
that role is not yet ended. Foreign
observers, who were openly baffled
by this feature of American life
("Perhaps no recent event stands
more in need of explanation," said
one British writer about the Scopes
trial) may be equally puzzled by current developments. For those here
and abroad who want to understand
fundamentali m, a religious force
deeply rooted in the American past
there could be few better place to
start than Fundamentalism and American Culture.
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A new British musical based on T. S. Eliot's
celebration of cats is an ailurophile's delight.
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T. S. Eliot
At the Top
Of the Pops

SCAT
CAST
ACTS
CATS
Richard Lee
Singing at astronomical heights
Handeling pieces from the Messiah ,
Hallelujah , angelic choir
The mystical divinity of unashamed felinity
Round the cathedral sang Vivat!
Life to the everlasting cat.
-Cats Prologue: Jellicle Songs
For Jellicle Cat

I begin by letting the cat out of
the bag. This review of Cats is written
by a lover of cats. Not just my cats.
All cats. If Time (December 7, 1981)
is to be trusted, I have just manfully
taken sides in the great cat controversy raging in America between a
growing and "prodigious number of
Americans" who "love 'em" and the
dogged and predictable reactionaries who "hate 'em." While disinterest is apparently possible toward dogs, there eem to be very
little middle ground concerning cats.
If you are still reading so biased
a review, you are at least not categorically opposed to cats. Therefore,
I probably owe you my theological

Richard Lee is Associate Professor of
Humanities in Christ College of Valparaiso University and Director of the
University's Overseas Study Center in
Cambridge, England.
April, 1982

bias too. I behold cats as catholic
and dogs as protestant. At least
most dogs strike me as protestant
in temperament. That is, if a man
wants a lot of floppy agape, a dog is
probably best for him. Dogs are an
open book, immediately accessible,
denominate themselves in roving
packs, worry about who is "top dog,"
preserve the male principle of unreflected action, and run liturgically free form. Canine grace is indiscriminate and lavish, energetic
and dutiful, and dogs are pretty
good at taking orders, doing tricks ,
and generally observing the protestant ethic of making themselve
useful and improving upon the time.
Dogs are probably man's best friend
because they are closest to man a
he is in himself.
Cats, on the other hand, see m
closer to God. Certainly they are
more catholic in temperament. That
is, if one wants to live with a my tery which disciplines hi
ensibilities to some of the depth of Iif ,
a cat is perhaps best for him. Cat
are independent and contemplative,
perform elaborate rituals of ablution
and oblation, pre erve th femal
principle of the pondered life, and
are more sensuously and fa tidiously inclined to be than to do. F line grace is preci e and di criminate, conditional and subtl , and cat
are more given to lives of patienc
and perseverance than anything lik
a barking and panting work thi
which might require them to b up
and doing. Dogs run to and fro , but
cats go in and out. Dog fri k, but
cats proces . Dog bound for you
but cats waft around you lik incense. A dog may guard your do r
and return your to d ball , but a
cat can keep hi eye on you in th
dark, predict a torm in th air and
afely land on hi paw if ou pit h
him out for th ni ht. To Ii
ith a
cat i to live with an impa i I
agile cont nted ompl xit whi h
i probably a fair d ription of
a He i in Him lf.

II
No theological choice is, of course,
ultimately required between dogs and
cats. No doubt their Creator intends
to preserve and perfect both dogs
and cats, not to mention protestants
and catholics, when He brings His
new heaven and new earth. It is,
however, probably not for nothing
that so deeply convert d an AngloCatholic a T. . Eliot wa much
taken by cats a pet - and a a frequ nt ource of poetic metaphor .
In one of hi arly poem he, like
Carl andburg, likened fo to a cat
who "rub it muzzle on th window
pane / Licked it tongue in the
corner of the v ning / ... mad a
udden 1 ap / nd eing that it wa
a oft October night / Curl d once
mor about th hou eand f 11 a 1 ep.'
While there ar oth r at m taphor
in hi eriou p em th r aft r, it
wa in hi light v r
writt n m1tially for hi god hildr n that cat
ame into th ir own. With tho
po m , oll t d into Old Possum's
Book of Practical Cats Eliot joyou 1y
mbra d the path ti fallacy and
attribut
c rtain human qualiti
t a d Ii htful array f f lin hara t r . Ea h p r n' at i hi own
Ror cha h ink-bl t t t, and what
w all r ad into our cat no doubt
ab ut u than th m.
would w ar that th
human -

m

m to
orr lative" of the
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It is likely that Eliot, the "Old Pussum," would have been astonished - and
delighted as well-with his eventual collaborators in the production of Cats.
beleaguered joy of being human.
When reading them to my own godchildren, I once wondered if there
were any sound more fitting for
harassed celebration than a loud
meow.
Cresset readers far from childhood

may need some reminding of Eliot's
marvelous quire of cats. There is
that old gumbie cat, J ennyanydots,
who sags and slumbers by day and
then rises wearily at night to tidy
up the whole household, even turning the kitchen cockroaches into a
troop of "well-disciplined helpful
boy scouts." There is Rum Tum
Tugger, the contrary cat who refuses all blandishments for his affection and "only likes what he finds
for himself"; in divine freedom he
"will do as he will do, and there's
no doing anything about it." There
is Bustopher Jones, the epicurean
cat about town who dines in alleys
behind the best clubs in town and
wears the weight of his prosperity
like a bishop. There are Mungojerrie
and Rumpleteazer, the original cat
burglars who work their mischief
like a vaudeville act of knockabout
clowns and are so inseparable they
have no identity apart from both
their names called at once.
There is Old Deuteronomy, so
ancient he is well into his ninth or
ninety-ninth life and commands the
respect of all who venerate, if not
age, then survival. There is Gus, the
shabby theatre cat, now down on his
luck but still on fire inside when he
recalls the great roles he played under the catwalks in his palmier days as
Asparagus. There is Skimbleshanks,
the railway cat who resolutely takes
charge of the 11:42 Night Mail Express and patrols it relentlessly to
see that the mail gets through. There
is Macavity, the mystery cat who is
always suspected but never detected
at the scene of every crime. There is
Mr. Mistoffeles, the conjuring cat
who can perform astounding feats of
prestidigitation and legerdemain,
including producing "seven kittens
22

right out of a hat!" And, in remaining
amphibolical order, there is Alonzo,
Bombalurina, Carbuckety, Cassandra, Coricopat, Griddlebone,
Growltiger, Grumbuskin, Jellylorum, Jemima, Munkstrap, Tantomile, Tumblebrutus, and Victoria.
For over forty years Eliot's cats
have charmed adults of all ages, especially children, and curled up in
their poems patiently waiting for
a composer, director, choreographer,
and stage designer to let them out
of the text and into their first night
at the theatre.

III
Eliot, the "Old Pussum," would
have been astonished and, I believe,
delighted with his eventual collaborators on the musical Cats. The
notion for it started with Andrew
Lloyd Webber, the composer of
Evita and the rock opera Jesus Christ
Superstar, who began making music
for Eliot's cat poems as "a metrical
exercise at the piano." A few of his
songs were performed for the delectation of friends in a club concert
attended by Valerie Eliot, the poet's
widow. She subsequently supplied
Webber with a sheaf of unpublished
poems and fragments of poems Eliot
had been working on for Old Possum 's Book of Practical Cats. Ultimately
most significant was a fragment of
"Grizabella: The Glamour Cat"
which Eliot left unfinished because
he could see her story might be too
sad for children. Nearly as significant was a reference in one of Eliot's
letters to a possible direction for a
"musical evening" for the poems in
which he propo ed that the cats
might finally go "up, up, up to the
Heaviside Layer" -whatever that
might mean.
Enter Trevor Nunn distinguished
director for the Royal Shakespeare
Company, whose stunning production of Dickens's Nicholas Nickleby
is currently removed to Broadway
(See "Doing Dickens Right" by

Richard Maxwell in November,
1981 Cresset) to rave reviews. The
common labor of a director of theatrical and literary classics and a
pop opera musician was apparently
just the potent mix Cats required.
Their fundamental problem was the
absence of a narrative for the collection of cat poems as a whole. When
one considers all the wrong choices
easy to make in this matter, the solution Cats takes is all the more
satisfactory. Instead of inventing
a story and narrator-the "Old Possum" himself comes to mind, or even
the "Man in White Spats" to whom
the poems are dedicated-Nunn and
Webber draw the narrative out of
the very essence of the poems themselves. Almost all the cats in the
poems are survivors in one way or
another, and that feline capacity
to survive is the fundamental grace
that unifies their several separate
stories. 1
The next step was to choose one
of the cats as the exemplar of feline
survival, and it wasn't far to go to
pick Grizabella who loved much but
not too wisely with every tom in
town. 2 By adding a few lines to
Eliot's own "Song of the Jellicles"
for the J ellicle cat ball, the narrative is set to reveal the one exemplary cat Old Deuteronomy will
choose to go "up, up, up to the
Heaviside Layer" at the end of the
ball. This modestly forced device
puts just enough suspense into the
evening, explains the gathering of
all the cats, and brings the musical
to its concatenations of frabjus joy
when forlorn and tattered Griza1

Even Simon Bond's ailurophobic 101 Uses
for a Dead Cat pays a certain perverted
homage to feline survival.

2

Grizabella sing the theme song "Memory"
which unn adapted from Eliot's "Rhapsody on a Windy ight." Webber's torch
mu ic for her lament reminds me of his "I
Don't Know How to Love Him" for Mary
Magdalene in Jesus Christ Superstar and
seems to link the two characters. Elaine
Paige's recording of" emory" now plays out
of every pub juke box in England .
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A second production of Cats will be opening on Broadway this autumn, and tickets
should be ordered now, even at Broadway prices. You need not like cats to like Cats.
bella at last is chosen. She goes
spinning up to the "Heaviside Layer"
(and literally out of the theatre by
a silver stairway which drops midair to meet her ascent and take her
out through the roof) during a roisterous and rumbustious finale. The
audience is left to decide what the
"Heaviside Layer" may be-reincarnation, apotheosis, coronation,
sainthood, or simply the sympathetic orgasm of the universe when any
of its creatures great or small finds
something bright and beautiful. As
the finale is staged, sung, and danced
at the New London Theatre on Drury
Lane, there is nothing left for Hollywood to do.
Cats is sung and danced from beginning to end, and none of the cast
is ever offstage or often at rest. The
overture is performed in the dark
with (literally) thousands of cat eyes
gleaming and winking at the audience while the dancers slip silently
toward the stage set in the round.
As the theatre lights come up on the
revolving stage-an immense scrap
heap of junked automobiles and
spare tires, scaled outsize to make
the dancers proportionate! y the size
of cats-the audience is immediately plunged into total theatre. English
music hall and Christmas pantomime conventions, much less the
conventions of an American Halloween masquerade of people dressed
up in cat costumes, are left far behind. Rather, Gillian Lynne, the
choreographer, has so turned her
dancers into cats that one suspects
she worked witchcraft on them. Costumed in the barest suggestions of
felinity-in a style I can only describe as sub-punk3 -the dancer
move the audience through the
sinuous, steal thy, and stalking
worlds of Eliot's domestic cats by
day and into the brawling, caterwauling, and reveling worlds of his
3

The "Eurodecadent" style of the punk-derived costumes gives the spectacle a omewhat sinister aspect and help save the show
from seeming "cute."
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wild cats by night.
Webber's score is not, m my
hearing, as fresh and winsome as
his earlier work, and some of the
electronic organ orchestrations are
too hurdy-gurdy, but the music is
more than serviceable. He gives
the dancers ample jazz, blues, swing,
and rock tunes, as well as some
chanties, torch songs, and pizzicato
patter songs to explore all the movements of cats that men and women
can incarnate. Indeed, it seemed to
me that some of the dancers may
have had cat backbone transplants
to pull off some of the suppler numbers-and perhaps claw transplants
when they danced on the balu trades of the balcony. The audience
quickly suspends disbelief as the
cast sings and dances us into the
lives and loves of each of Eliot'
cats and moves up triumphantly
to the finale of Grizabella's a cension. When Brian Blessed as Old
Deuteronomy (American audience
will remember Blessed as Bach in
the Lutheran Television Production of "The Joy of Bach") concludes the performance with a ung
declamation of Eliot's "The aming
of Cats," the cast scat down th
aisles to dance in the audienc and
some of the younger memb r of
the audience rise up to dance with
them. Even us older member of

the audience were not sure whether
the cast should be applauded or
given caviar and cream.
Eliot would have loved the total
theatricality of the evening, even
its pop sensibility, and he may further have enjoyed the irony that
Cats is clearly more popular than
any of hi own weighty plays. Surely
he knew that ometim s the world
nd not with a bang but a whisk r.

IV
As thi revi w i written in early
February, Andrew Lloyd W bber
ha ju t accept d a W t End Theatre Critic Award a the compo er
of Cats.
t the c remony h wa
plea d to announc that a cond
produ tion of Cats wa to op n on
Broadway thi autumn, and he wa
thu furth r honor d by th Am rican invitation to bring thi En Ii h
mu ical to th world nt r of mu ical com dy. Hi mod ty i comm ndabl , of our , but I wond r
if that world c nt r ha not n w
hift d t Lond n and m ri a
again th provin
Meanwhil
ord r
t
n w,
u
Of
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At the Bread Line
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d com
he do not m al n
h brin hi er wd,
th p r,
hiv rin alm
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ach carryin
a n w pap r bundle
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There is always a considerable difference between
the capability of power and the exercise of power.

The Limits of Power
In Poland and El
Salvador the Superpowers
Face Similar Limitations
Albert R. Trost

If there is one concept that is central to the discipline of political
science it is power. Political scientists are always talking about it, defining it, measuring it, criticizing
others' use of it, and using it themselves. Despite all of this attention
there is still a good deal of disagreement about what it is, where it is,
and how it is used.
Still, there would be general agreement on two conceptual points.
Power is generally understood to be
control over the behavior of others.
In addition, there is agreement that
there is a difference between the
ingredients of power, sometimes called
capabilities, and the exercise of power.
It is the exercise of power, an act,
which is most directly associated
with control of others' behavior.
While these distinctions are secondnature to political scientists, and
obvious to many others not in the
discipline, they sometimes seem to
escape our public officials, those

Albert R. Trost serves as Chairman of
the Department of Political Science at
Valparaiso University and wn·tes regularly for The Cresset on public affairs.
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who are formally charged with the
exercise of power.
To focus on the international system, there is some agreement among
experts in the field of international
relations that the size of armies, possession of nuclear weapons, access to
natural resources, industrial capacity, food production, and size of
population and land are important
ingredients of power. There is much
less agreement on the relative importance of each of these. For instance, is the possession of nuclear
weapons more important than independence of foreign sources of oil?
Even harder to get agreement on are
the so-called "intangible" ingredients of power and their importance
in the total inventory. Included in
the list of "intangibles" would be the
quality of leadership and decisionmaking in a society, the democratic
or non-democratic nature of the
regime, and public agreement on
national goals and objectives. The
number of ingredients on the list
and the weight assigned to each vary
considerably from expert to expert.
No one doubts that the list of ingredients favors both the United
States and the Soviet Union. It favors them to such an extent that they
rate the title, "super-power." There
is also agreement on ranking the
capabilities of China, Japan, and
India over Burma and Singapore,
Brazil and Argentina over Panama
and Ecuador, and France over Finland.
To simply compare the ingredients of power is not enough when
attempting to explain the power
relationships between two states.
The stiff resistance of Finland to
Soviet aggression in the "Winter
War" of 1939-40 could not have been
anticipated from comparing capabilities. More recently, the match-up
of the United States and orth Vietnam seemed to point strongly in the
direction of American ability to dictate terms to the other party. One
would think that the historical les-

sons have been sufficient to warn
any nation pretending to "great
power" status against assuming easy
or direct influence over seemingly
lesser powers. Two nations that
seem to be equating the ingredients
of power with power itself are the
United States as it deals with El Salvador, and the Soviet Union as it
tries to influence Poland.
James Fallows, in an article in the
October, 1979, issue of The Atlantic
Monthly on American defense policy, suggests a metaphor that is helpful for understanding our conceptual problems with power. The title
of the article was "Muscle-Bound
Superpower." To draw the metaphor in more detail, the Soviet
Union and the United States are in
the position of a well-developed
weight-lifter who finds himself in
the middle of a street fight where the
weapons are razors, bats, bricks, and
cunning. The weight-lifter has been
training for a competition with another weight-lifter. But strength
and well-developed muscles are of
little use in the street fight.

Both the US and the
USSR face situations
where they are, in a
sense, "muscle-bound." The Soviet Union apparently
would like Poland to adopt a more
orthodox and deferential MarxistLeninist posture. It would like limits
placed on the influence of the Solidarity union and the Roman Catholic church. The Russians generally
would like to see a Poland with
fewer ties to the West. They certainly would prefer a more substantial
economic contribution from the
Poles. These are the general goals
and objectives of the Russians for
Poland. So far, their impressive inventory of capabilities has been inadequate to achieving these objectives. The Russian nuclear weapon '
capability obviously has little application. The capability to launch a
The Cresset

The "ripple effect" of our involvement in El Salvador can be felt in Western
Europe, where it has a negative effect on our influence with our NATO allies.
thorough invasion of Poland could
also not be directly translated into
controlling Polish behavior in the
direction of Soviet goals. An invasion would most likely put Russians,
not Poles in charge.
But the real inhibition on the use
of enormous Russian capabilities to
influence the direction of Polish
policy is the unpredictable effect it
would have on the Russians' ability
to influence or control the behavior
of others outside the Polish ruling
circle. The unpredictable elements
include the reaction of the Polish
masses and the reaction of other
European nations. In other words,
the Soviet Union is called on to
exercise power in a world complicated by the mobilization of the
masses (popular democracy) and the
phenomenon of the interdependence of nations. Governments can
no longer be isolated in most countries from their population for purposes of directly applying pressure.
Nor can nations be isolated as easily
from other nations in a selective
application of force.
The Russians not only have to be
concerned about the consequences
of their exercise of power for the
behavior of the Polish ruling elite,
but for the behavior of the Polish
masses as well. They have to be concerned not only with the reaction of
the Reagan administration to their
exercise of power, but of governments and populations in Europe.
What may seem like a gain in the
policy of Polish rulers through the
application of martial law or the
threat of an invasion may set back
the neutralist, anti- A TO tide that
is running in some of the nations of
Western Europe. The Soviet Union
has to be concerned that in winning
more control in Poland it does not
lose influence with neutralist groups
in Holland and We t Germany that
are putting pressure on their governments not to go along with President Reagan's nuclear arms plan
for We tern Europe. Even more critApril, 1982

ical, the exercise of Soviet power in
Poland through martial law or invasion may mobilize large sectors
of the Polish population to oppose
Russian control.
From the restraint it has shown so
far in Poland, the Soviet Union
probably understands better than
the Reagan Administration the pitfalls in assuming that "super-power"
status and capabilities are the ame
as super power.

American failure to
comprehend the concept
of power seems clear in
the El Salvador affair.
American failure to comprehend
the concept of power seem cleare t
in our present involvement in El
Salvador. Our objectives in that
country now appear to be upport
of the Duarte-led junta in its fight
with the insurgents, a prefer nee
for an elected, civilian governm nt
of the center or center/right, and a
clear signal to Cuba and the ovi t
Union that we will not tolerate th ir
subversion of government in C ntral America. Although ther may
be legitimate opposition to th
objectives, once they are a um d
the temptation is to u e our tr m ndous advantage in capabilitie in th
Central American region (weap n
technology, capital, etc.) in ord rt
try to achieve the obj ctiv . in
El Salvador is where the imm diat
action is, it i easy to a um that it
should be the target of our ex r 1
of power.
There i little doubt that ur apabilitie are overwh lming wh n on
contemplate th ir application to 1
Salvador. They ar asily uffi i nt
to defeat the immediat in ur n
in that country. How v r on id rable caution i called for in i latin
who and what w are tryin t
trol and in b ing awar of th
ple effect' of our action .
r ta
Pre id nt R agan and
of tate Haig hav mad man tat -

ments which would indicate that
they think Cuba and Russia are directly behind the insurgency. If this
is so, how much does the use of our
capabilities in El Salvador work to
control Cu ban and Russian behavior? With regard to the target
for our exerci e of power, it i po sible that a rising tid of expectation and fru tration among the
poor in El alvador ( and perhaps
Bondura and icaragua) are the
major r a on for th in tability and
in urgen y. P rhap w are applying th wrong ingr di nt of pow r.
A much a r a on for u ing caution in d aling with El alvador a
getting cl ar who w ar trying to
control i th interd p ndenc b tw n our influ n
th r and our
pow r in oth r part of th r ion
and th world. W n d to b cl ar
about th
of
oun-
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Theatre II

Of all those involved in theatre, audiences care
most about a play coming to a satisfactory end.
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End of Play

Two Recent Plays Remind
Us of the Importance of
Ending Things Right
John Steven Paul
There is something about the end
of a play that engages the critical
intelligence of nearly every spectator in a theatre. In my experience,
directors are typically concerned
with the beginning of a play; playwrights with the middle; but audiences are always most concerned
with the end. "I didn't care for the
ending." "Life's full of misery. When
I come to a play, I want to see a happy ending." "The play was great
until the end-it seemed tacked on."
"The ending was false. Life isn't
like that." Lobbies and parking lots
ring with judgments about the end
of a play.
Certain critics and historians of
drama have identified form and historical period according to the way
groups of plays end. "Modern European Pessimism" became a generic
term during the latter years of the
nineteenth century, because plays
by leading dramatists-Ibsen,
Strindberg, Hauptmann, and Zolausually ended in distinctly unhappy fashion. The French critic Fer-

John Steven Paul, who is a stage director and teacher of dramatic literature
at Valparaiso University, is The Cresset's regular theatre critic.
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dinand Brunetiere distinguished
the major dramatic genres according
to the resolution of conflict; that
is, by the ways in which plays ended.
Aristotle's provocatively brief
commentary on Tragic poetry
opened the discussion of endings .
Tragedy is, we read in the Poetics,
an imitation of an action which has,
among other features, a beginning,
a middle, and an end. The end has
especial significance, for it is linked
to the elicitation of catharsis in the
audience. The meaning of catharsis
has been much disputed, but it has
to do with the emotional release of
the audience from the cell of terror
and pity in which it has been imprisoned while viewing the play.
Whatever else may be said about
catharsis, it surely cannot be present
until the play has ended.
The twentieth-century aesthetician and critic Susanne Langer
submits that the play's end is of the
essence of dramatic form. What
Langer terms the "dramatic illusion" is equivalent to suspended
form. "In a play, form is not valuable and cannot be valuable in itself,
because until the play is over form
does not exist. Only the suspense
of form has value."1 There is no
dramatic form, then, until the end
of the play. Drama, Langer writes
elsewhere, is the poetic mode of
destiny; it is action driving inexorably toward an end.

•••••
Two recent productions illustrate
the essential nature of the end in
dramatic form and the importance
of the end to a satisfying theatre
experience. Grownups, a new play
by Jules Feiffer, opened in New York
last fall. Its popular success (at this
writing the play is still running) is
probably due to the playwright's
excellent ear for language and his
1

Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form ( ew
York : Scribner's , 1953 ), p. 309 .

skill in setting the language down.
The play is a delight to hear ; the
dialogue dances with sophistication
and a lilting rhythm that becomes
more choreographically complex
as each character joins th e verbal
interplay.

The people in Jules
Feiffer's recent play
Grownups are like uspainfully like us.
Feiffer's subject has perennial
appeal for American audiences:
Grownups is a family play. And,
though this family is situated in a
specific geographical, socio-economic, and ethnic context, the people
are like us-painfully like us. There
are three generations here, represented by a mother and father, their
grownup daughter, son, and his wife,
and the son's daughter. Fueling the
plot are the family members' unrealistic expectations of one another
and their unspoken resentment of
one another which together feed an
ample reservoir of guilt. The plot
proceeds like a game in which characters move through a series of confrontations, exchanges of indirect
accusations, and reciprocal resentment. The more guilty feelings they
can generate in one another, the
further they move toward a kind of
personal, though Pyrrhic, victory.
Well-armed with a sense of their
opponent's vulnerabilities and
highly-skilled from practice, these
blood relations play for blood.
The confrontation between the
son, Jake, and his father, Jack, typifies the series of duels that make
up the play. Jack has spent his life
working hard, investing time,
money, and hope in his son's success. Jake has become a success by
any standard. He is comfortably affluent, married, and the fath er of a
beautiful child. Jake is a writer for
the New York Times and he is about
to have his first book published
bearing a book-jacket endorsement
The Cresset

Michael Weller's 1979 drama Loose Ends is not as gracefully or forcefully written
as Grownups, but it finally provides a more satisfying theatre experience.
by David Halberstam. For Jack and
his wife Helen, writing for the Times
is a certification of success; a printed
endorsement from Halberstam is an
undreamed-of benison from above.
Still, the father constantly wonders
"What's new?" in his son's life,
what else he's accomplished. Jack
scores extra guilt points by reminding
Jake often that he rarely gets to see
his granddaughter: "What's newwhere's my granddaughter? What's
new-where's my granddaughter?"
the resentful Jake barks in mocking
imitation of his father.
What works for father works for
son, and daughter, and daughter-inlaw, and even granddaughter. Jake
tells his sister Marilyn that she does
their parents no good by indulging
them; Marilyn responds that Jake
does them no good by ignoring them.
Jake pinpoints his wife Louise's
failure to answer their daughter's
every cry for aid as a basic flaw in
their family life. Further, Jake tells
Louise that it is her inability to
enter into serious discussions calmly
that stands in the way of overcoming
family difficulties. Louise rejoins
that Jake undercuts her disciplinary
strategies toward Edie and fails to
empathize with her situation as woman, wife, and mother. The little
girl predicts personal disaster if
her father doesn't help her with her
homework and she shames her parents for bickering at home. Each of
these accusers implies that the
family's life would be perfect were
it not for faults and thoughtlessness
of the person being accused.
The middle of the play comprises
the gradual development of a labyrynthine network of guilt and resentment
transactions.
This
development is accompanied by an
upward-spiraling of tension. Feiffer
continues the spiraling in Act III.
Jack and Helen come to visit Jake
and Louise, escorted by their daughter Marilyn. For the fir t time in
the play all the characters will be
in immediate proximity to one anApril, 1982

other. This confrontation has all
the aspects of a scene oblige, a conclusive battle which will bring the
drama to an end.

Grownups fails because a
play is not a comic
strip: a punch line will
not serve as an end line.
"What's new-where's my granddaughter," Jack chants. Edie run
from him in childish revul ion.
Helen presents Edie with a book, a
copy of which the child already own .
The little girl's inconsiderate proclamation of the fact leads to roundabout sparring on all sorts of i u
both related and unrelated to the
present: how to graciously accept
a gift, gratitude, respect for other '
feelings, manners, right to priva y
in the home, deference, and whether
or not failing to return books to a
lending library is an immoral act.
The scene begins to boil until Jake,
unable to bear up any longer, climacticall y declares that he and
Louise have decided to separate and ,
in a final masterstroke, that th unhappiness of his entire life mu t b
blamed on his parent and th ir
treatment of him a a child . e
sense an imminent ending now. But,
like other attack in the play, Jak '
hysterical thru t i parried by the
competing claims of oth r who p rcei ve themselve a the injur cl
parties. Jake's intended p roration
become only another accu ati n.
Yet the play mu t end, or at l a t
stop, for it has run it cour . Edi
asks her father th rea on for hi
ranting and ravin . Jak lo k at
her helple s in hi fru trati n
and ay , "Edie, I'v quit th Times!'
E DOFPLAY.
The play ends in medias res.
feel cheated. B trayed. Fr m
beginning, thi drama wa
with a en e of d tiny: a
ling if not ominou
thi action wa l adin
m \ h r
It doe n 't. On w nd r : p rha

Feiffer intended the New York Times
to be a symbol of the entirety of
Jake's pre ent xi tence. When he
quits hi job, hi exi tence comes
to an end. If that was the playwright's int ntion, it doe n't work
on tag . The ymboli mi not trong
enough to bring a en e of do ure
to th plot. Th structure of Grownups i lik that of on of Feiffer'
comic trip . Thr frame of buildup and a final £ram for a punch
lin . "Edi ,I'v quitth Times."What
uc eed in th comic , fail in the
th atr : a pun h lin will not rv
for an nd lin
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Art is a structured imitation of life, not an
exact copy-a rendering of life, not a video tape.
innocence of the sixties is destined
to be ravaged by the reality of adulthood in the seventies.
Paul and Susan part in Bali, but
they meet up again in the States. Paul
introduces Susan to some of his
friends in the Boston area. The two
decide to set up housekeeping,
though without the sanction of marriage. They begin to make a spare
living in independent careers-he
in film editing, she in photography.
Their lives and relationship change.
They marry. Susan is the first to
commit herself to steady work as a
photographer and to begin to make
concessions to the demands of her
high-powered profession. Paul's
film-editing business becomes increasingly successful. In the middle
years of their marriage, they find
that together the demands on their
time and their own growth are
driving a wedge between them. Paul
wants a baby, Susan isn't sure. Paul's
career takes him to Los Angeles;
Susan's takes her to New York City.
Susan becomes pregnant. Without
telling Paul, she aborts the fetus.
They separate. Paul remains in Boston. Susan moves to New York.

Real life is textured
and tainted with matters
unfinished, lingering
from and belonging to
all our times past.
Afterthreemonths,Paul and Susan
reunite in New York. Now, however,
there are many loose ends to be tied.
They move on. People they meet
become people they once knew. They
prosper in their professions. They
make money and with it they buy
things, including the supreme symbol of American materialism, a
Weber grill. Of the several loose
ends that dangle untied, it is the
issue of the child that trips them
up. Paul learns of Susan's abortion
from a friend. His pain strips him of
his reason and his memory of the
good times the two had enjoyed to28

gether. The play reaches a searing
climax as Paul's pain erupts from
him like madness and he shouts his
tragic recognition of the emptiness
of their relationship. The scene ends
with Susan's decision to call a lawyer, but the play has not ended.
It has been the pattern of the
action that a matter of unfinished
business has lingered after one
scene and has appeared in another.
In the final scene, Weller ties up
the loose ends. Paul, now divorced
from Susan, is visiting her in the
cottage where they were married.
They reminisce about old times.
A new reality intrudes upon their
dreamy remembering. Jerry, Susan's
boyfriend, is waiting out in the
car. Paul asks when they'll see one
another again, anticipating a weekend of lovemaking. "I don't think
we'd better do this again," Susan
replies. Car noise: it's Jerry. Susan
gathers her things to leave, but before going outside, she turns to Paul.
"Bye, babe," she says. "Bye," he returns. (They hug.) END OF PLAY .
Paul and Susan are at an end.
There are no more chances, no more
loose ends to be tied up. The exchanged words, "bye," have conferred an end upon the action and with
that end comes release for the audience.
It is true that in life there are few
absolute endings - few clean, conclusive, final statements that mark
the close of one segment of experience and clean the slate for the next.
Real life is textured and tainted
with matters unfinished lingering
from and belonging to times past.
Still, art at its best is a tructured
imitation of life, not an exact copya rendering of life, not a video tape.
This is the source of art's seductive
appeal for us; art is not like looking
at life through a window but through
a lens. Art intensifies, clarifies, and
interprets life experience partly
by structuring; that is, by imposing
upon experience a beginning, a middle, and an end.
Cl
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A Guide to the Christian Message. By
David G. Truemper and Frederick A.
Niedner, Jr. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
144 pp. $5.95 (paper).

The editor of this journal knew
what he was in for. Asking as he did
a doting teacher to review a book by
two former, favorite students is
bound to produce something incestuous. And I, having now been
presented with that temptation,
could hardly be expected to forego it.
So, yes , I do admit to being pleased
and only a little embarrassed that
years of old classroom secrets, including puns and cliches, have now
surfaced in such a public medium
as this theological manual for a new
generation. But I hasten to add that
these intergenerational borrowings
are not as numerous as rumored
and that where they do occur they
probably do so with better grace
than at their first appearings.
Naturally it is reassuring to learn
that today's undergraduates will
still be reading: that essentially "the
Bible is problem-solving literature,"
that its God is the decisive "evaluator," that his "criticism" or "diagnosis" is consistently "far worse"
than we prefer, reflecting "the law's
double bind" ("Damned-if-you-doand-damned-if-you-don't") and a
justice which is "merely fair"; also
that his justice is "trumped" by his
mercy in Jesus Christ, whose aptest title is "the friend of sinners "
who "became Lord by becoming . . .
the 'curse' for us," nece sitating his
cross and only therefore his resurrection; al o that his "promises can
The Cresset

be received only by trusting them,"
faith being "the one means of setting
into effect the reality that is promised"; also that the foremost task
of Christian theology is "keeping
the Good News good," and doing so
by means of "the double test for doctrine: make maximum use of the
crucified Christ, and provide comfort and consolation to troubled
sinners."
If many of the above themes,
even some of the theological quips,
sound hauntingly familiar, that
could be because they come not just
from a single seminary's pedagogical tradition but also from a domain as public as the Gospel of Matthew, Paul's Romans and Galatians,
the Nicene Creed, Luther's catechisms, the Augsburg Confession,
and here and there even a bit of
Whitehead, Aquinas, and Marx.
On the other hand, if I were asked
to guess what the more immediate
influence has been which accounts
for this book's excellence, I would
point to the "private, self-consciously Christian university" at
which Truemper and Niedner teach
and to which they refer in the book's
introduction. I happen to know
enough about that fascinating community, both inside and outside its
department of theology, to recognize its salutary effects upon these
two authors. Item: the very literateness of the book reflects a Valparaiso
tradition of Christian urbanity,
wording the Word with a care for
its humor no less than its holiness.
Item: an acknowledgment of alternative theological traditions impels
the authors not to apologize for
their own tradition as one arbitrary choice among others (that
would be chicken) but, with truly
collegial pluralism, to accept public
responsibility for arguing their
case as reasonably as they can. Item:
even the semi-popular level of this
'catechism" does not tempt the
authors to settle for cheap, premature certitudes, but what is historically iffy, also in scripture, is freely
and scientifically admitted. Item:
in a booklet on doctrine, a very brief
one at that, it is gratifying to find
April 1982

as much of the university's ethical
concern for the world as there is,
and not only in the chapter on "Justice and Mercy." Item: the priority
of the sacraments and sound preaching in Valparaiso's liturgical tradition is everywhere in the book,
unabashedly pastoral yet never
clerical or elitist.
After all is said about this book's
ancestries- remembering that books
on Christian doctrine have no business being too original - this one
does show, in appropriate way , also
delightful originality. Two of my
favorite sections, for sheer freshness
of insight, are the three-page thriller
on our Lord's "descent to the dead"
and chapter eight-a sure candidate
for a devotional classic-on "the
'Abba' prayer." Watch for the quotables in these sections to reappear
in the habitual language of Niedner's
and Truemper's students, among
whom I now count myself.
The book's brevity n ce aril
leaves plenty of unanswered que tions, which should make it a boon
for classroom discussion. For instance, "Should a Christian ev r
rebel against parents or governments who have become unjust or
unloving?" a question which is pos d
but not answered , at least noticeably. Or, the Fifth Petition of the
Lord's Prayer: doesn't it sound "a
if one is asking to be forgiven only
to the extent that one can or will
forgive those who have harmed or
offended oneself"? Sure, but what
is the answer? It i n't only i it,
that what we are really praying i
"Father, make us forgiver aft r
your own heart"? Really, a th
Large Catechism remind u , we do
forgive one another, ma b not
from the heart but till with G d'
very forgiveness. What el are w
doing in the Euchari t wh n w
change The Peace?
There are other urg nt qu
which are not rai ed in o man
words but almo t are. Grant d it i
e ential that the acram nt w r
in tituted by the hi torical J e u
but then mu t not their dominical
in titution be om how
rifiabl
hi torically? Or, ince on
f th

distinctions of this book is its luxurious use of scripture, notably the
Old Testament, all the more reason
to ask, by what right do we non-Jews
read the sacred literature of another
people as if it were ours, all the while
calling it "old" -and then answer
that que tion. Or, the dogged que tion of universalism: "if sinner do
not hear or listen to that word [of
forgivene s], . . . they go unforgiven, at lea t to all appearance ."
What does that mean, profe or,
"to all appearance "? It take a good
a book a thi to evoke uch tough
que tion .
Frequ ntly r qu t om for a
hort, r adabl , up-to-dat introduction to hri tian doctrin . I now
know ju t the
m to r omm nd.
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Robert W. Bertram

Ecotopia Emerging
By Ernest Callenbach. Berkeley: Banyan
Tree Books. 326 pp. $7.95 (paper).
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prised at an ecologically-based alternative vision, living as we do in
the world of Three Mile Island,
Agent Orange, Love Canal, PCB,
and acid rain.

Ecotopia Emerging is
an entertaining yet
serious book, and it
focuses on a key issue.
Now Callenbach has written about
Ecotopia emerging, the historical
process by which Ecotopia was created in the 1980s and 1990s. In · a
sense, this is a more dynamic and
novelistic story than Ecotopia itself,
since it deals with the political and
social conflict that brings out the
secession and successful creation of
the new state. The tale involves a
variety of characters, all of whom
play a role in political change: a
precocious teenager who builds a
cheap photovoltaic battery for solar
power generation, thus permitting
people to unhook from the power
company; leaders of the Survivalist Party (mostly women), who articulate the political and ecological
stance of the movement; corporate
executives and politicians, who oppose and fear the movement; Cancer
Commandoes, people dying of cancer who blow up chemical plants;
and so on.
The plot centers on the increasing
refusal of Pacific Northwestern
people to accept the environmental
risks demanded of them. In acts of
almost frontier defiance to centralized authority, they withdraw not
only their support for high-tech,
but also their allegiance to the
United States. The U.S., bogged
down in conflicts in Brazil and Saudi
Arabia, desperate to keep the hightech economic system of the East
and Sunbelt going, and hamstrung
by bigness, finally acquiesces in
the secession.
While the Ecotopians restore some
human-scale sanity and respect for
nature in their peaceable kingdom
in the Pacific Northwest, the Americans experience inertia, decay, and
the desperate entanglements of their
economic and political empire30

widespread poisoning by chemical
and nuclear accidents, ever-increasing military expenditures, the
brink of war over threatened oil supplies, inflationary spirals, contaminated food and water supplies,
government repression accompanied by sporadic uprisings in blighted and poor cities, and a bankruptcy
of traditional economic and political panaceas. The book ends with
Ecotopia emergent as a green beacon
in a world committing ecological
suicide.
Ecotopia Emerging is an entertaining yet serious book, and it
sketches what may be the central
social issue of our immediate future:
the relationship of American society
to nature. This futurist fantasy
speaks to the question of how we
live and how we should live. It recognizes that we are badly split, and
will continue to be, over what it is
that we want and what we are willing
to sacrifice to get it. The social and
political polarization in the 1980s
will likely be along the usual class
and party lines, to be sure, but at
the core is likely to be the issue of
what we can and should do to our
environment.
Indeed, this novel suggests that
the evil done to nature will be returned in kind; a horror movie
could retitle the book, "The Revenge of Nature." Those that destroy
Nature are destroyed for their destruction. The gigantic consumptive
machine of advanced industrial
society, insatiable in its gluttony
for more, is destroyed by the natural catastrophes it brings to feed
its ever-expanding appetite. Those
who possess reverence for Naturea form of cosmic piety- and create
a kind of retribalized Rousseauan
Gemeinschaft in the Northwest
are blessed by Nature.
Our attitude toward Nature has
always had an element of schizophrenia to it. On the one hand, the
logic of capitalism and empirebuilding demanded the domination
and use of Nature. But on the other
hand, we were the heirs of the Garden of the World, and it was our
responsibility to preserve it and be

part of it. This has always been a
theme in Jeffersonian democracy
(and indeed, the altruistic teenager,
when she visits Washington, goes to
the Jefferson memorial, and notes
that the marble statue is being eaten
away by acid rain), in our fascination with the spectacular scenery of
America, in the conservation movement that created the national parks,
in the "back to nature" movements,
and in the contemporary environmental movement. And as Callenbach understands, there is a religious root to this vision: one should
not despoil Eden. In any case, as
Leo Marx has discussed, we cannot
make up our mind about the place
of "the machine in the garden."
One may draw many messages
from such a rich, provocative, and
perhaps even prophetic book. On
the first page, the author conjures
up the image of Rome and notes
that "many such great centers of
civilization arose and flourished and
then collapsed-in a majestic cycle
almost as imposing as the earth's
own seasonal rhythms." Perhaps
what Callenbach portrays is the devolution of empire. Historians since
Thucydides have told us of the burdens and corruptions of empire, and
how eventually they cannot meet the
challenges that face them. They grow
gigantic and cumbersome and aged,
unable to control the entropic
forces they had previously brought
under their command. They stumble
from crisis to crisis, unable to understand or control the world they once
dominated. For whatever the mix
of reasons, the historical finger
writes, and having writ, moves on.

We could be witnesses
in America to a new
version of an old theme:
the decline of empire.
So it may be with contemporary
America. If history is the rivalry
and succession of empires, the rise
and fall of imperial orders, then we
may simply be witnessing a new version of a very old theme: the devolution, the "waning," of the American Empire. The felt imperatives
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of empire-economic and political
power exercised to keep the empire
going- become demonic and indeed
self-defeating. One senses in this
book what is lurking out there- the
idea that government is remote and
uncaring, that institutions are inhuman and inflexible, that the
established order is corrupt and arrogant, that decadence and decay
pervade society, that we are unable
or unwilling to solve our problems,
including the fundamental peace
with Nature. The entropy of power
stems from entropy of will, and rival and more vigorous powers take
matters into their own hands. So too
do ordinary people.
If the American political, industrial, and military establishment are
the Romans of this tale, the Survivalists are the Christians. Like the
Christians of old, they have to learn
new survival skills to survive in a
disintegrating society bent on its
own destruction. The pragmatics
of the system become demonic instead: the system either will not or
cannot stop its commitment to power
and growth, but that demonic commitment becomes all the more
destructive. It should be expected
in such periods of devolution that
people will take their lives into
their own hands too. If the Survivalists are the Christians, then innercity street gangs will be the vigorous
barbarians who will sack the temples
and palaces.
Such speculative interpretation
is a melancholy view of contemporary history, but one that reminds us
of the finiteness of our worlds- natural, imperial, historical. It also
reminds us that the quest for power
is not the same as the quest for happiness, so we shouldn't be surprised
when popular movements occur
which seek happiness at the expense
of power. There is no reason for us
to expect that we should be any more
exempt from the historical logic of
empire than the Athenians, Romans,
or British. Nor should we be surpri ed that when empire submerges,
other forms of life-other empireshould emerge. Perhaps Callenbach
hould now write a third volume on
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the decline and fall of the Ecotopian empire, since it too will not
defeat the ultimate empire, the Empire of Time.
Yet the Ecotopians seem a benevolent and rational alternative. Certainly Callenbach's version of the
future is one of the few hopeful
ones at the moment. Compare the
humane world of Ecotopia with
Robert Heilbroner's bleak vision

of a hopeless future of chaos and
ruin, or Orwell's enduring image
of an equally hopeless future of control and slavery. The idea that we
might escape both chaos and control,
and create a world like Ecotopia, is
as yet only an idea, but one may certainly hope that it is an idea whose
time has arrived.
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James Combs

Foxes
If the light had not been citron color, illuminin
to glass
translucency; if a pastoral breeze had not lift d
the grass
like spindrift to my feet, I might n ver have topp d
nor stood,
silent in the sunny wood.

The vixen came first, out of the bra k n-r f d
dried-out runnel,
her pointed snout lifted from th darkn
of the tunnel;
four little foxes, half-blind in th unny, n n-day
air
followed snuffling from the lair.
Half a square from the hou , half a quar fr m
the street,
no twig cracked, no leaf unfold d. Th fo ·t d,
braced feet
lifting her body, triangular ar al rt. Th hr cl
floundered to play
like puppies in a hop di play.
The short, sharp bark in th night-, h rd
it often then,
and we saw them in th umm r qui t n ar
the hidden den;
never domestic, but law-abidin r mind r that
Adam gave nam
to beast and bird, love-worth , tam .
Greyhound bu or truck on th hi h" a " ul ha
caught them oon
had it not b en th rifl hot in a ni ht
more quiet than noon.
If the Son of Man had n t wh r n t la hi h ad
no hut, nor holl w
what hall the creature d but f 11 , .
Sister Maura
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Of Ringstraked Cattle
And Dead Seed
John Strietelmeier
One of our departmental majors
from the 1950s, when I was still
teaching a course in historical geology, writes from her home in the
Southwest. She is still troubled by
the apparent contradictions between
the Scriptural record and the geologist's reconstruction of earth
history. She wants to know whether
I have given the matter any further
thought.
Actually, to be frank about it, I
have not. I am very much aware of
the difficulties of mind and conscience which many of my students
over the years have experienced as
they tried to bring their theology
and their science into line with each
other. For more than a decade it was
not only my duty but my very special privilege to give them whatever
help I could in their struggle.
I always felt, though, that I could
be of only very limited help to anyone engaged in this struggle, for I
had never been through it myself.
My earliest theological training, in
parochial school, was thoroughly
fundamentalist. But as a compulsive
reader in a house which contained
few books, I had gotten hooked on
the King James Version of the Scriptures and in that marvelous book I
had read all manner of quaint and
curious things, some of which offended my sense of propriety, and
some of which contradicted my experience of reality. So, in effect, all
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the while I was being fed a potentially lethal diet of fundamentalism,
I was sneaking the powerful antidote
of the Scriptures, taken straight.
Thus, for instance, when I ultimately encountered the theory of
organic evolution, it seemed no
more inconsistent with the Faith
than the biology of Genesis 30:37-39,
where that admirable rascal, Jacob,
had taken him rods of green poplar
and of the hazel and chesnut tree
and piled white strakes upon them
and set them before the flocks in the
gutters of the watering troughs
when the flocks came to drink that
they should conceive when they
came to drink. By this stratagem,
you may remember, Jacob was able
to selectively breed ringstraked,
speckled, and spotted animals
which, under an agreement with his
uncle Laban, he was entitled to keep
for himself.
Nor do I recall being upset on
first encountering our Blessed Lord's
own mistaken assertion that "except
a corn of wheat fall into the ground
and die, it abideth alone: but if it
die, it bringeth forth much fruit." I
don't think that I have ever believed
that seeds are planted so that they
can die and I doubt that any of the
prosperous old farmers in St. Peter's
congregation believed that either.
But neither have I ever, so far as I
can remember, thought that it was a
sin to be mistaken.
I owe a great deal to fundamentalism, especially two things: first,
the awareness that every serious
question has an inescapable theological dimension and, second, the
enriching and enlarging experience
of growing up in the Scriptures. I
suppose that it may be the very size
of this debt that makes me so impatient with fundamentalists, so annoyed with what strikes me as their
insistence upon trivializing the very
treasures which they have done so
much to preserve against a hostile
or uncaring world.

But "trivializing" is, in my judgment, the only word for what
happens when consciences are
bound to a particular theory of cosmic or human origins, when the
strata and structures of the planet
are accounted for by ingenious and
often ingenuous speculations about
what an unprecedented and unrepeatable universal deluge might
accomplish, when imprecatory
psalms are forcibly baptized into
expressions of Christian piety, when
chronologies and family trees are
covered by a warranty of inerrancy
since to question their accuracy
might raise doubts about whether
God really was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself.
The Bible deserves better than
that. At the very least, it deserves
to be taken with full seriousness as
the world's greatest and, in some
ways, most varied anthology of literature. It can be read as literature,
and perhaps it would be well for us
to do so before we begin to use it as
a source of information and doctrine.
It does, after all, make quite some
difference whether a particular piece
of writing is a myth, a song, a drama,
a sermon, a collection of wise sayings, an eye-witness account of
events, a theological treatise, or a
piece of apocalyptic writing. Failure
to discern the literary genre can get
us into the position of taking literally things that were probably meant
more figuratively, and, worse still,
taking figuratively hard things
that were meant all too literally.
But the ultimate test of meaning
in the Scriptures is not literary, but
theological. "They are they which
testify of Me," said the Word made
flesh. What truth the early chapters
of Genesis have to tell us is not
about the rocks or the origins of
life, but about Jesus Christ. If it'
rocks that preoccupy you, there are
a number of excellent geology text
that will serve you better than
Genesis.
Cl
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